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. Introduction
In the 1930s, Frank Manaka sought work as a fisherman off the coast of
Monterey, California. He chartered a boat but was unable to fish or market his
catch. Local canneries would not purchase fish from him. In 1940, he filed
suit against the Monterey Sardine Industries, Inc., a cooperative association of
fishing boat owners, and the Del Mar Canning Company for allegedly
conspiring to set prices and restrict entry into the California sardine fishery.'
Under an agreement between the association, the local canneries, and the local
fishermen's union, the association set the price for which its members' fish
were sold to canneries and reduction plants. The canneries, in turn, agreed to
purchase fish exclusively from members of Monterey Sardine assigned to them
by the association. Manaka was not a member, so he could not sell his fish.
Although Monterey Sardine may have operated like the typical collusive
cartel, it served both pecuniary and conservation purposes. On the one hand, it
increased members' profits by restricting entry by nonlocal fishers and
increasing fish prices. On the other, it helped to conserve fish stocks by
limiting the harvest.4 Challenged by Manaka, the court found Monterey
Sardine Industries guilty of conspiracy in restraint of trade under the Sherman
Act. 5 The federal district court noted that the association was "not freed from
the restrictive provisions of the anti-trust act" merely because they sought "the
conservation of important food fish." 6 In other words, the association's conduct
was no less exclusionary because it served, in part, to conserve fish stocks.
In the 1930s, the California sardine fishery was at its peak, yielding over
500,000 tons of fish per year.7 By the early 1950s, the annual catch had
dropped to under 20,000 tons, as the fishery began to collapse; "the pressures
on the fishery were too great, and by 1952 for all practical purposes, the
1. See Manaka v. Monterey Sardine Indus., Inc., 41 F. Supp. 531, 532 (N.D. Cal. 1941)
(describing Manaka's suit against Monterey Sardine Industries, Inc. and Del Mar Canning
Company that alleged a conspiracy to restrain him from fishing and marketing his products).
2. See id. at 533-34 (discussing collusive arrangement between Monterey Sardine, local
canneries, and the fishermen's union).
3. The association later offered Manaka an assignment that would enable him to sell fish
in Monterey after another boat was "disabled." Id. at 534-35.
4. By the time of this litigation, the state of California had already adopted some fishery
conservation regulations. Id. at 533. These controls would eventually prove inadequate.
5. Id. at 536. See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2000) (introducing the Sherman Act).
6. Manaka, 41 F. Supp. at 534.
7. See GARY D. LIBECAP, CONTRACT NG FOR PROPERTY RIGHTs 76 (1989) (describing the
California sardine industry).
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commercial sardine fishery was finished."8 It is possible that the sardine
fishery's collapse was unavoidable. Commercial harvesting might have
depleted the fishery even if Monterey Sardine Industries' collusive arrangement
had been permitted to survive. Likewise, changing environmental conditions
might have made the collapse inevitable.9 Then again, perhaps if it were not
for antitrust enforcement, this tragedy of the marine commons might have been
avoided.
Although it is not a new environmental problem, overfishing is arguably
one of the most serious environmental problems today.' ° Despite decades of
government regulation, fisheries are in trouble the world over."' "Forty-five
years of increasing fishing pressure have left many major fish stocks depleted
or in decline," reports the World Resources Institute.12 Approximately 65% of
8. Id. at 76-77; see also Harry N. Scheiber, Success and Failure in Science-Policy
Interactions: Cases from the History of California Coastal and Ocean Studies, 1945-73, in
IMPROVING INTERACTIONS BETWEEN COASTAL SCIENCE AND POLICY 98, 101 (1995) (noting the
California sardine fishery's "devastating crisis" and "catastrophic collapse" and the failed efforts
to impose more stringent catch limits).
9. See, e.g., Francisco P. Chavez et a., From Anchovies to Sardines and Back:
Multidecadal Change in the Pacific Ocean, 299 SCI. 217,217-20 (2003) (discussing the impact
of climatic changes on sardine and anchovy populations). But see John G. Williams, Sardine
Fishing in the Early 20th Century, 300 ScI. 2032 (2003) (attributing sardine fishery collapse to
overharvesting); Francisco P. Chavez et al., Response, 300 ScI. 2033 (2003) (responding to
Williams).
10. Indeed, fishery depletion is one of the few issues upon which apocalyptic
environmentalists and their critics agree. For example, the Worldwatch Institute reports:
Many populations of fish are in exceptional peril. More than ever, there is an urgent
need to change the way fisheries are managed. Without reforming the underlying
causes of overfishing-namely overcapacity and open access-fisheries and fishers
are doomed to a desperate future.
Anne Platt McGinn, Promoting Sustainable Fisheries, in WORLDWATCH INST., STATE OF THE
WORLD 1998, at 59-60 (Linda Storke, ed. 1998). Bjorn Lomborg, who is otherwise quite
dismissive of Worldwatch Institute projections, largely accepts that fisheries are in serious
trouble. See BJORN LOMBORG, THE SKEPTICAL ENVIRONMENTALIST: MEASURING THE REAL
STATE OF THE WORLD 106-08 (2001) (acknowledging that numerous ocean fisheries are over-
fished and suffering declining yields, and that future increases in fish production will come from
aquaculture and fish-farming rather than ocean fisheries); see also Ronald Bailey, Prologue:
Environmentalism for the Twenty-first Century, in THE TRUE STATE OF THE PLANET 4 (Ronald
Bailey ed., 1995) (discussing overfishing as an environmental problem exemplifying the tragedy
of the commons phenomenon).
II. Fishery economist Ralph Townsend notes that "the overall state of the world's
fisheries is much worse today than 45 years ago, even though most fisheries have come under
government regulation in this period." Ralph Townsend, Producer Organizations and
Agreements in Fisheries: Integrating Regulation and Coasian Bargaining 222 (prepared for the
Political Economy Research Center's Political Economy Forum "Evolving Property Rights in
Marine Fisheries," Big Sky, Montana, Jan. 2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
12. WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE, DIMINISHING RETURNS: WORLD FISHERIES UNDER
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fisheries are fully exploited or overexploited, according to the United Nations
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), and the number of overexploited
fish stocks continues to climb. 3 An additional 10% of fisheries are
"significantly depleted" or are producing less than their potential because they
are recovering from depletion. 4. Canada closed its Atlantic cod fishery in 1992
when stocks were on the verge of collapse. Ten years later, some stocks are
"barely recovering," 5 and others need to be closed again.' 6 Fisheries scientists
recommended a similar ban on European catches of Atlantic cod in 2002.17
Although global fish production has increased significantly over the past three
decades, much of this increase has come from an expansion of aquaculture as
production from capture fisheries has leveled off since the 1990s.' 8 The rest is
an artifact of"massive over-reporting" of fish catches by the People's Republic
of China.' 9 Moreover, there is increasing concern that efforts to maintain catch
quantity is diminishing catch quality and undermining fishery sustainability.2°
PREssuRE (2000), available at http://www.wri.org/trends/fishloss.html (last modified July 20,
2000).
13. See FISHERIES DEP'T, U.N. FAO, THE STATE OF WORLDFsHERIESANDAQUACULTURE
2002, at 22-23 (2002) (stating that the number of fully exploited fish stocks in the world is
relatively stable at 47%, while the number ofoverexploited stocks stands at 18% and continues
to rise steadily).
14. See id. at 23 (discussing the depletion of the world's fish stocks).
15. See Canada Looks at Further Cuts to Ailing Cod Fishery, at http://www.enn.com
/news/wire-stories/2002/11 /l121 2002/reu_48998.asp (Nov. 21,2002) (describing the depletion
of stocks of cod in the Atlantic and the effect of such depletion on the Canadian fishing
industry) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
16. See Quiin Schiermeier, Europe Dithers as Canada Cuts Cod Fishing, 423 NATURE
212, 212 (2003) (stating that in April 2003, the Canadian fisheries ministry ordered an end to all
cod fishing in several regions along the Atlantic coast).
17. See David Malakoff& Richard Stone, Scientists Recommend Ban on North Sea Cod,
298 Sci. 939, 939 (2002) (discussing recommended ban on cod fishing in the North Sea and
other historic fishing grounds). See generally Schiermeier, supra note 16, at 212.
18. U.N. FAO, World Fisheries: A Choice of Futures, in WORLD AGRICULTURE:
TOWARDS 2015/2030, SUMMARY REPORT 38, 39 (2002), available at http://www.fao.org/docrep
/004/y3557e/y3557e00.htm. Aquaculture production, also known as "fish farming," has more
than doubled in the last fifteen years and now accounts for over one-quarter of human fish
consumption. Rosamond L. Naylor et al., Effect ofAquaculture on World Fish Supplies, 405
NATURE 1017, 1017 (2000).
19. See Daniel Paulyet al., Towards Sustainability in World Fisheries, 418 NATURE689,
691 (2002) (noting that once China's over-reporting is corrected, fishery landings have been
declining since the late 1980s).
20. Fishery scientists believe that the commercial fish catch is shifting "down" the food
web from larger fish to smaller fish and invertebrates. As a result, the open sea fish catch
accounts for a declining share of table fish consumption and overall fishery sustainability is
threatened. See Daniel Pauly et al., Fishing Down Marine Food Webs, 279 Sci. 860, 860-63
(1998) (discussing the move in global fishing over the past forty-five years towards harvesting
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According to one recent study, stocks of large ocean fish species have dropped
to 10% of their historic levels due to overfishing.22
On the open seas, overcapacity is the norm, leading to what many describe
as "too many boats chasing too few fish. 22 The plight of domestic fisheries is
no less grave.23 The National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) reported that
in 2002, sixty-six fish stocks were subject to overfishing, and another eighty-six
species were already overfished. 24 In the same report, NMFS acknowledged
that out of the 932 fish stocks under federal management, the status of nearly
700 is unknown.25 While NMFS reports the number of healthy fish species has
increased in recent years, such gains have come at a tremendous cost to local
fishing communities faced with fishery closings and other stringent
conservation measures.26 Populations of once abundant food fish such as cod,
haddock, and flounder may be near collapse.27
With little doubt, the federal fishery regulations adopted in the last twenty-
five years have failed to ensure sustainable utilization of U.S. fisheries. 28 The
smaller invertebrates and planktivorous fishes); see also J.F. Caddy et al., How Pervasive is
"Fishing Down Marine Food Webs"?, 282 Scl. 1383, 1383a (1998) (disputing Pauly's
findings); Daniel Pauly, Response, 282 Sci. 1383, i 383a (1998) (responding to Caddy et al.).
21. See Ransom A. Myers & Boris Worm, Rapid Worldwide Depletion ofPredatory Fish
Communities, 423 NATURE 280,280 (2003) (stating the results of a study on the exploitation of
large predatory fish in the world's oceans). See generally Daniel Pauly & Reg Watson,
Counting the Last Fish, ScI. AM., July 2003, at 42.
22. See, e.g., ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE, INDIVIDUAL FISHING QUOTAS: AN IMPORTANT
MANAGEMENT TOOL TO PROMOTE SUSTAINABLE FISHERIES, available at http://www.environ
mentaldefense.org/documents/1969_IFQ Brief4.pdf (last visited Jan. 17,2004) (using the phrase
to describe a potential problem); James Sanchirico & Richard Newell, Catching Market
Efficiencies, RESOURCES, Spring 2003, at 8, 8 (same).
23. See generally PEW OCEANS COMM'N, AMERICA'S LIVING OCEANS: CHARTING A
COURSE FOR SEA CHANGE (2003), at http://www.pewoceans.org/oceans/index.asp (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
24. OFFICE OF SUSTAINABLE FISHERIES, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SUSTAINING AND
REBUILDING: NOAA 2002L REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE STATUS OF THE U.S. FISHERIES 17-18
tbl. 1 (2003), available at http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/sfa/reports.html.
25. See id. (stating that out of a total of 932 federally managed fish stocks, the services
could not determine whether 695 of the stocks were overfished).
26. See, e.g., Colin Nickerson, Violence, Bureaucracy Hobble Canada's Struggling
Fisheries, BOSTON GLOBE, June 21, 2003, at Al (noting social unrest caused by fishery
closures); Noel C. Paul & Christian Scripter, 'Mayday 'from New England's Coast, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR, Apr. 29, 2002, Work & Money, at 15 (describing the detrimental effects of
efforts to rejuvenate fish stocks on New England's fishing communities).
27. See Bob Holmes, Biologists Sort the Lessons of Fisheries Collapse, 264 S0. 1252,
1252 (1994) (discussing the scientific debate over the causes and effects of fishery collapse).
28. Although U.S. fisheries are among the most regulated in the entire world, they remain
in dire shape. Josh Eagle & Barton H. Thomson Jr., Answering Lord Perry's Question:
Dissecting Regulatory Overfishing, 46 OCEAN & COASTAL MGMT. 649,650 (2003).
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existing regulatory framework is "a failed experiment that has led to the
destruction of United States coastal fisheries."29 At the same time that the
federal government adopted an elaborate regulatory structure, federal law has
impeded the development of cooperative fishery management institutions that
may have helped address fishery decline. Specifically, antitrust law has
condemned arrangements, such as the one created by Monterey Sardine
Industries, that could help ensure fishery sustainability by limiting catches.
This Article explores the tension between antitrust principles and
conservation of the marine commons. Part II provides an overview of fishery
conservation efforts in theory and practice. As a common pool resource,
marine fisheries will fall prey to the "tragedy of the commons" unless
consumption is limited to sustainable levels-whether through property rights,
community norms, or government regulation. Part III briefly explains the
antitrust concerns raised by efforts to restrict output, fix prices, or allocate
territories. Although each of these actions may, in specific circumstances,
facilitate conservation efforts, they are each presumptively suspect under
antitrust law. Part IV explores the conflict between conservation and antitrust
in fisheries, focusing on cases where competitors or government officials
sought to prosecute fishing unions and other cooperative fishery organizations
for antitrust violations. These cases illustrate that collective efforts by fishers to
control exploitation of underlying resources are presumptively illegal under
antitrust law. This Part also explores potential exemptions for certain types of
cooperative institutions as well as the impact of antitrust concerns on the
implementation of property-based fishery management regimes. Part V
considers how antitrust concerns might inhibit conservation or other
environmental goals in the contexts of oil production and pollution control.
While the focus of this Article is fishery conservation, the analysis is potentially
applicable to other contexts where antitrust law inhibits nongovernmental
common pool management efforts.
While existing antitrust doctrine conflicts with fishery conservation
efforts, this need not be the case. Part VI explores how conservation objectives
might be reconciled with antitrust concerns. Insofar as antitrust doctrine is
motivated by efficiency concerns, antitrust law need not be hostile to private
efforts to conserve common pool resources. The doctrine of ancillary restraints
provides a sound analytical foundation for approving at least some cooperative
fishery conservation efforts under the rule of reason. Insofar as existing
29. David L. Allison, Problems with U.S. Ocean Governance and Institutional Structures:
The Impact on Waters, Fish, and Fisheries in the US. Exclusive Economic Zone, in PEW
OCEANS COMM'N, MANAGING MARINE FIsHERIEs IN THE UNITED STATES 25,25 (2002), available
at http://www.pewoceans.org/reports/pewmanaging fisheries.pdf.
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antitrust precedent forecloses such a result, statutory measures may facilitate
private cooperative fishery conservation efforts. In either case, antitrust law
should be made more hospitable to nongovernmental conservation efforts.
I. Conservation of the Marine Commons
Garrett Hardin's influential essay The Tragedy of the Commons 0
described the fate of a common pasture that was owned by no one but available
to all. In such a situation, each herdsman will maximize his use of the
commons at the expense of the community at large. Each individual herdsman
captures the complete benefit of adding one additional animal to his herd. Yet
the cost to the pasture, in the form of overgrazing, is dispersed among all of the
users. Insofar as adding one additional animal contributes to overgrazing, that
cost is distributed equally among all pasture users, so each individual herdsman
has little incentive to exercise restraint. Yet, when all the herdsmen act in this
fashion, the commons becomes overgrazed and tragedy results.3 Thus, Hardin
warned, "Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all. 32  To prevent
overexploitation, use of the pasture must be limited so as to constrain
consumption and prevent overuse.33
30. See generally Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Sci. 1243 (1968).
31. As Hardin explained, "[E]ach man is locked into a system that compels him to
increase his herd without limit-in a world that is limited." Id. at 1244.
32. Id. at 1247. It should be pointed out that the "tragedy of the commons" describes the
condition of open-access commons. The mere existence of a "commons," or some form of
common ownership, does not necessarily produce the tragedy Hardin describes. Historically,
common pastures were rarely open-access, as use was controlled by common property rules,
customary norms, or other restraints on resource exploitation. See generally ELINOR OSTROM,
GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990);
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CUSTOMS AND CULTURE: INFORMAL SOLUTIONS TO THE COMMONS
PROBLEM (Terry L. Anderson & Randy T. Simmons eds., 1993); Susan Jane Buck Cox, No
Tragedy on the Commons, 7 ENVTL. ETICS 49 (1985). Such open-access commons problems
only occur when there is sufficient use to threaten the sustainability of the resource. When local
populations are relatively small, aggregate catch levels are simply not large enough to cause
fishery depletion, irrespective of whether the fishery is an open-access resource. See Anthony
D. Scott, The ITQ as a Property Right: Where It Came From, How It Works, and Where It Is
Going, in TAKING OWNERSHIP: PROPERTY RIGHTS AND FISHERY MANAGEMENT ON THE ATLANTIC
COAST 31, 31-32 (Brian L. Crowley ed., 1996) (noting that the "race to fish" only arises after
there is sufficient demand for fish to become economically scarce).
33. See Randall Bess & Michael Harte, The Role of Property Rights in the Development
of New Zealand's Seafood Industry, 24 MARINE POL'Y 331, 331 (2000) ("[The challenge for
any fisheries policy and management system is to determine and enforce harvest levels that will
sustain fish stocks and access rights to fisheries.").
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Hardin used the metaphor of a common pasture, but he could just as well
have described a fishery. Indeed, while Hardin's essay popularized the concept
of the "tragedy of the commons," fishery economists first articulated the
concept as applied to fisheries over a decade earlier.a4 Ocean fisheries
represent the archetypal commons problem where open access leads to
overconsumption and depletion of the resource.35 In place of herdsmen grazing
animals on a common pasture, fishing boats all seek to exploit a common
fishery. The incentive faced by each individual fisher is quite the same as that
faced by the hypothetical herdsman. Each individual fisher captures the
benefits of increasing fishing effort-perhaps by adding additional labor, gear,
or an extra boat. The costs to the fishery, however, are spread across all of the
users. The result is overfishing and the eventual depletion of the fishery.
Limiting the fish catch can sustain the resource, but no individual fisher has
sufficient incentive to exercise such restraint.36
The initial choice of solutions to the commons problem, as described by
Hardin, is between political controls and some form of private property. "The
tragedy of the commons.., is averted by private property, or something
formally like it," but where private property is lacking, the commons can only
be saved by "mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon. 3 7 As Hardin presented
it, conservation of the commons requires either privatization or government
regulation. In either case, the aim is the same: Control access and limit
overuse of the underlying resource.
34. See generally H. Scott Gordon, The Economic Theory of a Common-Property
Resource: The Fishery, 62 J. POL. ECON. 124 (1954) (applying the commons concept to
fisheries); Anthony Scott, The Fishery: The Objectives of Sole Ownership, 63 J. POL. ECON. 116
(1955) (same). Gordon and Scott themselves were not the first to make this observation.
Aristotle made the same point much earlier. See ARISTOTLE, POLITICS § 1261 b (Benjamin
Joweth trans., 1943) ("[T]hat which is common to the greatest number has the least care
bestowed upon it.").
35. A.W. May, Foreword, in TAKING OWNERSHIP: PROPERTY RIGHTS AND FISHERY
MANAGEMENT ON THE ATLANTIC COAST, at v, v (Brian L. Crowley ed., 1996) ("[T]he single
overwhelming feature which bedevils attempts to produce prosperity and stability in the fishing
industry is the common-property nature of resource exploitation.").
36. As Anthony Scott observes, "No one will take the trouble to husband and maintain a
resource unless he has a reasonable certainty of receiving some portion of the product of his
management; that is, unless he has some property right in the yield." Scott, supra note 32, at 63.
While it may be an overstatement to claim that "no one" will act in such a manner, this is clearly
a case in which the exception proves the rule.
37. Hardin, supra note 30, at 1245-47; see also Gordon, supra note 34, at 135 (noting
that marine resource conservation can "be accomplished only by methods which make them
private property or public (government) property, in either case subject to a unified directing
power.").
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Private property tends to avert the commons problem because property
owners have a substantial incentive to maximize the value of the resource in
question.3" This tendency necessarily requires accounting for the value that
others place on the resource and the value of sustaining the resource over
time.39 The benefits of property ownership do not depend on each owner acting
solely, or even primarily, with a profit motive.4° In addition to providing
incentives for greater resource stewardship, property rights also foster private
ordering by reducing the transaction costs associated with negotiating over
remaining externalities.4'
Despite the potential benefits from property rights, individual ownership is
rare in marine fisheries.42 Many fish species are mobile across vast distances,
38. See Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Tragically Difficult: The Obstacles to Governing the
Commons, 30 ENVTL. L. 241, 243 (2000) ("Both field investigations and social science
experiments have shown that privatization, when possible, is typically a particularly effective
solution to the tragedy of the commons.").
39. See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 Am. ECON. REv. 347,
355 (1967) ("[If a single person owns land, he will attempt to maximize its present value by
taking into account alternative future time streams of benefits and costs and selecting that one
which he believes will maximize the present value of his privately-owned land rights.").
Demsetz's claim is not that every single property owner will act in this fashion. Rather, it is that
the incentives created by ownership are such that the typical property owner will act so as to
maximize the present value of her own property. The behavior of specific individuals will vary,
however, with some taking greater or lesser actions to maximize the present value of the
property in question, but the norm will remain. Those property owners that do the best job of
estimating likely future income streams are then rewarded in the marketplace with greater
property values.
40. See, e.g., Robert J. Smith, Resolving the Tragedy of the Commons by Creating Private
Property Rights in Wildlife, I CATO J. 439, 456 (1981) ("Wherever we have exclusive private
ownership, whether it is organized around a profit-seeking or nonprofit undertaking, there are
incentives for the private owners to preserve the resource.").
41. See David Schmidtz, The Institution of Property, in THE COMMON LAW AND THE
ENvIRONMENr 109, 120 (Roger E. Meiners & Andrew P. Morriss eds., 2000) (describing the
advantages of privatization in dealing with externalities); see also Steven N.S. Cheung, The
Structure of a Contract and the Theory of a Non-Exclusive Resource, 13 J.L. & ECON. 49, 50-
54 (1970) (discussing how the presence of private property rights and the knowledge of such
rights by parties leads to a reduction in the costs associated with externalities, and illustrating
this idea through the example of commercial fishing). For a more complete discussion of the
role property rights play in facilitating private ordering, with specific attention to fishery
conservation, see Jonathan H. Adler, Legal Obstacles to Private Ordering in Marine Fisheries,
8 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REv. 9, 22-28 (2002).
42. Individuated property ownership entails a single owner or ownership entity, but it
need not require a sole proprietor. Corporations, cooperatives, and other organizations can also
be sole owners. Where property rights are secure, a sole owner will have an incentive to
maximize the present value of the resource, whether it is a single individual or an institution of
some sort. See Scott, supra note 34, at 140-41 (examining the exploitation of a fishing ground
under unified control); see also Ralph E. Townsend & Samuel G. Pooley, Corporate
Management of the Northwestern Hawaiian Islands Lobster Fishery, 28 OCEAN & COASTAL
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and the ocean's expanse makes it difficult to monitor access to marine fisheries.
These factors, among others, make it particularly costly to define and enforce
property rights in the marine context.43 Because the costs to define and defend
property rights in marine fisheries are often greater than the benefits to be
derived therefrom, individual property rights rarely emerge. 44 There are some
exceptions, however, such as privately owned oyster beds.45 In addition,
changes in technology over time can facilitate the expansion of property rights
in natural resources."
If property rights in fisheries exist, they tend to be collective or "common
property" rights.47  As McKean and Ostrom explain, "Common property
regimes are a way of privatizing the rights to something without dividing it into
pieces."48 Typically, such regimes "have evolved in places where the demand
MGMT. 63, 68 (1995) (noting that "there is no need to abandon private property approaches in
order to achieve collective decision-making" because "[a] corporation is essentially a set of
resource owners who must make unified decisions about jointly-owned assets").
43. See Ronald N. Johnson & Gary D. Libecap, Contracting Problems and Regulation:
The Case of the Fishery, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 1005, 1019 (1982) (describing the inherent
difficulty of regulating property rights related to fishing); see also Thompson, supra note 38, at
244-45 (noting the difficulty in implementing solutions to commons problems).
44. See Demsetz, supra note 39, at 350 (noting that "property rights develop to internalize
externalities when the gains of internalization become larger than the cost of internalization").
45. See generally Richard J. Agnello & Lawrence P. Donnelley, Prices and Property
Rights in the Fisheries, 42 S. ECON. J. 253 (1975); Richard J. Agnello & Lawrence P.
Donnelley, Property Rights and Efficiency in the Oyster Industry, 18 J.L. & ECON. 521 (1975).
46. See Bruce Yandle & Andrew P. Morriss, The Technologies of Property Rights:
Choice Among Alternative Solutions to Tragedies of the Commons, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 123,139-
41 (2001) (explaining how changes in technology alter the costs of defining, defending, and
transferring property rights). A good example of the role of technology in the evolution of
property rights is how the development of barbed wire and branding facilitated the definition of
property rights on the Western Range. See Terry L. Anderson & Peter J. Hill, The Evolution of
Property Rights: A Study of the American West, 8 J.L. & ECON. 163, 175 (1975) (discussing the
impact of technological advances such as barbed wire on the development of property rights in
the American West). It is possible that similar technological development is occurring, or could
yet occur, in the context of marine resources. See MICHAEL DE ALESSI, FISHING FOR SOLUTIONS
48-53 (1998) (describing how the technologies of branding and fencing could be used to
facilitate the development of private property rights in the fishing industry); Daniel Huppert &
Gunnar Knapp, Technology and Property Rights in Fisheries Management, in THE
TECHNOLOGY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 79, 88-96 (Terry L. Anderson & Peter J. Hill eds., 2001)
(discussing various technological innovations and explaining how they impact rights-based
management in the fishing industry).
47. See generally OSTROM, supra note 32; Michael De Alessi, Fishingfor Solutions: The
State of the World's Fisheries, in EARTH REPORT 2000: REVISITING THE TRUE STATE OF THE
PLANET 85 (Ronald Bailey ed., 2000); Donald R. Leal, Community-Run Fisheries: Avoiding the
"Tragedy of the Commons", PERC POLICY SERIES PS-7 (1996).
48. Margaret McKean & Elinor Ostrom, Common Property Regimes in the Forest: Just a
Relic From the Past?, 46 UNASYLVA 3, 6 (1995).
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on a resource is too great to tolerate open access, so property rights in resources
have to be created, but some other factor makes it impossible or undesirable to
parcel out the resource itself.' 49 In such cases, the rules governing the use of
the fishery are somewhat informal, often arising out of local custom or
community practice. In other cases, there have been efforts to adopt formal
collective rules to limit catches and conserve the underlying resource. In each
case, the management regimes have evolved over time in an effort to increase
the returns to the users of the resource.
Common property and other "collective" approaches to fishery
management appear to have been quite successful.50 Such arrangements often
evolve over time to facilitate "orderly exploitation and conservation of the
resource."'" Today, some fishing communities have turned to various
cooperative approaches to help rationalize fishery management.52 Collective
associations may also have a comparative advantage against government
agencies in regulating fishing activity, particularly in the development,
acquisition, and distribution of relevant information about fish stocks, fishing
activity, and the like. 3 In New Zealand, holders of individual fishing quotas
(IFQ) have begun to collaborate to conserve fish stocks by, among other things,
monitoring catch levels and supporting fishery research.
4
49. Id. at 6.
50. See Leal, supra note 47, at 2 (stating that community-based local management of
fisheries has been used to prevent the tragedy of the commons).
51. Gordon, supra note 34, at 134.
52. See infra Part IV.E and accompanying text (describing results of cooperative
approaches to fishery management).
53. See Anthony Scott, Obstacles to Fishery Self-Government, 8 MARINE RES. ECON. 187,
193 (1993) (noting "that a self-governing fisher group may be able to get its information at
lower real costs than under regulation"); Scott, supra note 32, at 82 ("[Flishers on the water can
seek and provide more kinds of data, of better quality, than have simply emerged as byproducts
of fishing."); see also C.J. Batstone & B.M.H. Sharp, Minimum Information Management
Systems and ITQ Fisheries Management, 45 J. ENV. ECON. & MGMT. 492,493 (2003) (noting
that "rights-based management systems provide a basis for an information generating
mechanism that could prove useful in fisheries management"), at http://www.sciencedirect.com
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Peter S. Burton, Community Enforcement
ofFisheries Effort Restrictions, 45 J. ENV. ECON. & MGMT. 474,475 (2003) (noting "concern
that central authorities do not have the intimate knowledge of the resource that may be held by
local residents, particularly those active in the fishery"), available at http://www.
sciencedirect.com; Ralph E. Townsend, Fisheries Self-governance: Corporate or Cooperative
Structures?, 19 MARINE PoL'Y 39,39 (1995) ("Local communities have extensive information
about the resource and about the industry and its technology that is very useful in designing
effective rules.").
54. See Alison Rieser, Property Rights and Ecosystem Management in U.S. Fisheries:
Contracting for the Commons?, 24 EcoLOGy. L.Q. 813, 823-24 (1997) (describing New
Zealand's IFQ system).
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Cooperative self-governing institutions in fisheries have, by and large,
focused on controlling many aspects of the fishery. To date, however, few have
focused explicitly on protecting the fish stock by directly controlling catch
levels."5 Distributional conflicts and heterogeneity among fishers may well
account for some of this.56 It may also be the case that in many fisheries, the
gains from explicit catch controls do not outweigh the information and
contracting costs required to create and enforce such limits.5 7 Government
involvement has not been neutral in this regard. Collective arrangements
among private firms to reduce output or allocate market shares are inherently
suspect under conventional antitrust jurisprudence, even if the intent or effect is
to conserve an otherwise threatened ecological resource. 8 In simple terms,
some ecologically beneficial arrangements are against U.S. law. By limiting
the sorts of cooperative arrangements that fishers or other common pool
resource users may adopt to limit access or utilization of the underlying
resource, government policy may inhibit the development of more effective
self-governing conservation measures.
While there are many examples of common property and other property-
based approaches to marine conservation, 9 the dominant management
approach of the past several decades has been the use of government
regulation.6° In practice, such regulations turn the fishery from an open-access
55. See Scott, supra note 53, at 189-90 (discussing attempts at fishery self-governance
and the outcome of such efforts).
56. See LIBECAP, supra note 7, at 86 (explaining the problems that lead fishermen,
politicians, and bureaucrats to favor catch-enhancing policies rather than policies that restrict
individual fishing).
57. As Harold Demsetz notes, property rights in resources may emerge when the benefits
from the creation of the property rights exceed the costs of defining and defending such rights.
Demsetz, supra note 39, at 351.
58. See infra Part IV (discussing the conflict between conservation and antitrust in
fisheries).
59. See generally DE ALESSI, supra note 46; De Alessi, supra note 47; Steven F. Edwards,
Ownership of Renewable Ocean Resources, 9 MARINE REs. ECON. 253 (1994); Kent Jeffreys,
Rescuing the Oceans, in TuE TRuE STATE OF THE PLANET 295,307-27 (Ronald Bailey ed., 1995)
(discussing approaches taken towards conserving commercial fisheries through property rights
including those of the United States, Japan, and New Zealand); Donald R. Leal, Cooperating on
the Commons: Case Studies in Community Fisheries, in WHO OwNs THE ENVIRONMENT? 283
(Peter J. Hill & Roger E. Meiners eds., 1998); Donald R. Leal, Homesteading the Oceans: The
Casefor Property Rights in U.S. Fisheries, PERC POLICY SERIES PS-19 (2000).
60. The primary federal statute governing fishery management is the Magnuson Fishery
Conservation and Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-82, enacted in 1976. Under the Act,
eight regional fishery management councils are responsible for developing management plans
for regional fisheries in federal waters that are consistent with national standards. The regional
councils are overseen by the National Marine Fisheries Service, a division of the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration within the Department of Commerce. Fisheries in
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resource into a "regulated open access" resource, 6' and the results-"tragic
6
1
and "spectacular failure" 63 -have been little better. 64 As in the open-access
commons, fishers operating under "regulated open access" have little incentive
to steward the underlying resource or support sustainable regulatory measures.65
Even where fishery management decisions are made by "expert" administrators,
resource users typically view long-run decisions as "substantially unpredictable
and unresponsive. "66 The lack of a concrete property interest in the fishery
means that individual fishers have no expectation that sustainable management
will inure to their benefit. 67 Thus, they push regulatory entities to allow higher
harvest rates.6' This problem is compounded by the scientific uncertainty
inherent in fishery assessments, which provides fishers with an excuse to push
for less conservative catch limits.69 "The result is a continuous, unidirectional.
increase in fishing effort, and in some cases fishery collapse," the existence of
regulatory structures notwithstanding.7 °
state waters are governed by state law.
61. See Frances R. Homans & James E. Wilen, A Model of Regulated Open Access
Resource Use, 32 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 1, 1 (1997) ("[M]ost of the world's most important
fisheries operate under what might best be termed regulated open access."), available at
http://www.sciencedirect.com.
62. Harry N. Scheiber & Christopher J. Carr, From Extended Jurisdiction to
Privatization: International Law, Biology, and Economics in the Marine Fisheries Debates,
1937-1976, 16 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 10, 53 (1998) (describing the "tragic failure" of fishery
management under the Magnuson Act).
63. Rieser, supra note 54, at 813; see generally Shi-Ling Hsu & James E. Wilen,
Ecosystem Management and the 1996 Sustainable Fisheries Act, 24 EcOLOGY L.Q. 799(1997).
64. Indeed, even the most heavily regulated fisheries are subject to substantial
overfishing. Eagle & Thomson, supra note 28, at 650.
65. See Scott, supra note 32, at 44-45 (discussing incentives for fishermen under
regulation).
66. Townsend & Pooley, supra note 42, at 70.
67. See Scott, supra note 32, at 45 ("[I]f there is anything that damns a governmental
regulation regime more than its direct and indirect effects in raising costs above their level in an
unregulated fishery, it is the unconstructive, even nihilistic, attitudes to long-run stock and
ecosystem dynamics that it engenders in fishers.").
68. See Townsend & Pooley, supra note 42, at 70 (noting that for fishers under regulation
"the best strategy is to get as many concessions as possible from the current administration").
69. See A.A. Rosenberg et al., Achieving Sustainable Use of Renewable Resources, 262
Sc1. 828, 829 (1993) (citing the problems of measuring marine fish stocks as a reason why
fishery managers have maintained harvesting levels rather than reducing such levels); see also
Thompson, supra note 38, at 258-59 (noting that scientific uncertainty leads fisherman and
others to overestimate the size of fish stocks).
70. Louis W. Botsford et al., The Management of Fisheries and Marine Ecosystems, 277
Set. 509, 512 (1997).
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Fishery regulations have typically taken the form of limits on season
length, boat size, equipment, and even total seasonal catch. None has worked
particularly well, largely because they fail to alter the open-access nature of the
resource. 71 Season limitations produce a "race to fish" as fishers seek to catch
as much as possible before the fishery is closed. 72 The results are rampant
overcapitalization 73 and a destructive "derby" system in which each fisher races
to catch as much as he or she can before the season closes. 74 Where such
restrictions are combined with seasonal catch limits, the result is a fast and
furious fishing season, sometimes lasting little more than several days.75
Efforts to control total catch by mandating that fishers use less efficient means
of catching fish encourage fishers to increase their investment in additional
vessels or gear to compensate for the efficiency losses. If regulations require
the use of less effective nets, fishers will simply purchase additional nets to
make up for the lost catch. Such restrictions "are to a large extent futile, since
the ingenuity and inventiveness of the fishers means that regulatory restrictions
frequently lag behind the latest techniques for circumventing the rules.
7 6
71. See Terry L. Anderson & Donald R. Leal, Fishing for Property Rights to Fish, in
TAKING THE ENVIRONMENT SERIOUSLY 161, 162 (Roger E. Meiners & Bruce Yandle eds., 1993)
(describing attempts to solve the fishery commons problem through various regulations and the
failure of such attempts due to the absence of property rights); see also DE ALESSI, supra note
46, at 31-35 (summarizing the impact of fishery regulation); R. Quentin Grafton, Performance
of and Prospects for Rights-based Fisheries Management in Atlantic Canada, in TAKING
OWNERSHIP: PROPERTY RIGHTS AND FISHERY MANAGEMENT ON THE ATLANTIC COAST 145, 147-
48 (Brian Crowley ed., 1996) ("[A]ttempts to regulate fishing effort by controlling certain inputs
does not change the incentive of fishers to compete among themselves for the limited harvest.").
The failure of fishery regulation is economic as well as ecological. See generally Scott, supra
note 32.
72. Season limitations or catch limits that result in a shortened fishing season also
produce a "race to process" and overcapitalization in the processing sector. Scott C. Matulich et
al., Toward a More Complete Model ofIndividual Transferable Fishing Quotas: Implications of
Incorporating the Processing Sector, 31 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 112, 120 (1996), available at
http://www.sciencedirect.com.
73. See Homans & Wilen, supra note 61, at 17 ("[R]egulated fisheries are likely to attract
even more redundant capital than was predicted by Gordon's unregulated open access model.").
74. See Donald R. Leal, Fueling the Race to the Fish, in GOVERNMENT VERSUS
ENVIRONMENT 38,48 (Donald R. Leal & Roger E. Meiners eds., 2002) (describing how fishery
regulations resulted in the shortening of the season for the Alaska halibut fishery to only afew
days). The race to fish is bad not only for the fishery, but for the fishers as well, as the scramble
to maximize the catch in a short period of time increases the occupational hazards of
commercial fishing. Id.; see also Bonnie J. McCay, Social and Ecological Implications of
ITQs: An Overview, 28 OCEAN & COASTAL MGMT. 3, 4 (1995) (noting that traditional
regulation has "led to overcapitalization, drastically shortened seasons and losses of life and
property").
75. Id.
76. Brian L. Crowley, Introduction, in TAKING OWNERSHIP: PROPERTY RIGHTS AND
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Efforts to protect fisheries by directly controlling entry have not fared much
better.7 License systems may limit the number of boats or firms in the fishery,
but they do not control the amount of effort. As with season limitations, or gear
restrictions, license limits also tend to encourage overcapitalization and the
"race to fish. 78
Regulatory failures have been compounded by government subsidies to
fishers that further increase unsustainable exploitation of marine fisheries.79
These subsidies range from income supports to direct and indirect subsidies of
capital and operating costs. 0 Such subsidies compound the overcapitalization
already brought about by the "race to fish," and further undermine the effort to
ensure fishery sustainability.
In recent years, there have been efforts to move away from command-and-
control regulation toward property-based management regimes.8' The most
notable of such systems involve the allocation of individual transferable quotas
(ITQs), also known as individual fishing quotas (IFQs). Under an ITQ regime,
a management entity, typically a government agency, sets the total allowable
catch for the fishery. Individual fishers are then allotted shares of the annual
catch in the form of a transferable right, or "quota." Fishers may catch up to
FISHERY MANAGEMENT ON THE ATLANTIC COAST 4 (Brian L. Crowley ed., 1996); see also Hsu &
Wilen, supra note 63, at 806-07 ("The technological resourcefulness of fishermen has
historically made a mockery of the most stringent and carefully crafted command and control
regulations aimed at reducing fishing effort.").
77. See E.A. Keen, Common Property in Fisheries: Is Sole Ownership an Option?,
MARINE POL'Y, July 1983, at 197,200 (noting the overall conclusion that limited entry has not
worked very well). Limited entry systems may restrict the total number of fishers or boats, but
such restrictions "fail to correct problems associated with the commons and create serious
impediments to efforts made to restore and enhance productivity of fishery resources." Id. at
211; see also Grafion, supra note 71, at 147 (noting that limited entry in Canada's Atlantic
fisheries failed to reduce fishing effort).
78. See Crowley, supra note 76, at 4. Crowley states:
Fishers' licenses give them no right to a share of the catch, but only a right to put
their lines or nets or traps in the water, so each fisher invests disproportionate
capital in his catching and storage capacity, to increase his chances of getting an
adequate share of an uncertain harvest.
Id.
79. See Leal, supra note 74, at 49-59 (discussing how subsidies to fishers contribute to
overfishing)
80. The various types of subsidies include income supports, capital and operating cost
subsidies, foreign access subsidies, resource management subsidies, and cross-sectoral
subsidies. See id. at 49.
81. May, supra note 35, at v (noting that "a body of new experience, founded on private
rather than communal rights in the fisheries is emerging"). For further description of this
movement, see Adler, supra note 4 1, at 18-22.
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their quota in a given season or transfer some portion to others. Although not a
pure property right, ITQs reduce the "race to fish" and create greater incentives
for fishery conservation. Because shares of the total catch are allocated, one
fisher's gain is no longer another's potential loss.?2 Each fisher now has an
incentive to increase her profit by reducing fishing costs and increasing the
volume of recoverable product from the fish caught. Given that ITQs are
transferable, over time more efficient fishers tend to purchase quota from those
who are less efficient, increasing the overall efficiency of the fishery.83
New Zealand adopted the first ITQ regimes in the mid-1980s.84 Since
then, they also have been adopted in several other countries, including
Iceland,85 as well as parts of Canada86 and the United States. 87 In practice, ITQ
systems have increased fishing efficiency, reduced overcapitalization, and
lessened the ecological impact of fishing operations. 88 At the same time, ITQ
82. See Scott, supra note 32, at 46-47 (noting the benefits of the ITQ system).
83. See Sanchirico & Newell, supra note 22, at 10 (explaining the practices of fishery).
84. DE ALESSI, supra note 46, at 41. In New Zealand, ITQs are used to manage over 180
fish stocks, covering 100 species of fish. Bess & Harte, supra note 33.
85. See HANNES H. GISSURARSON, OVERFISHING: THE ICELANDIC SOLUTION 16-21 (2000)
(noting that although Iceland arguably created the first ITQ system in 1979, it did not utilize a
comprehensive ITQ system until 1991 when the Fisheries Management Act came into effect).
86. See ROBERT REPETTO, THE ATLANTIC SEA SCALLOP FISHERY IN THE U.S. AND CANADA:
A NATURAL EXPERIMENT IN FISHERIES MANAGEMENT REGIMES 6-7 (200 1) (noting that Canada's
sea scallop industry began moving towards a right-based system-which includes ITQs-in the
mid-1980s); R. Quentin Grafton et al., Private Property and Economic Efficiency: A Study of a
Common-Pool Resource, 43 J.L. & ECON. 679,682 (2000) (noting ITQs have been introduced
in Canada); Bonnie J. McCay et al., Individual Transferable Quotas in Canadian and U.S.
Fisheries, 28 OCEAN & COASTAL MGMT 85, 87 (1995) (recognizing that Canada had a form of
individualized quotas from the late 1970s until 1990, when the first true 'ITQ' fishery for
groundfish was established on the east coast of Canada by an order of the Minister of Fisheries).
87. In the United States, ITQ programs were implemented in the Mid-Atlantic Surf Clam-
Ocean Quahog, South Atlantic Wreckfish, and North Pacific Halibut-Sablefish. See Keith R.
Criddle & Seth Macinko, A Requiemfor the IFQ in US Fisheries, 24 MARINE POL'Y 461, 462
(2000) (noting these individual fishing quota programs were implemented during the 1980s and
1990s). ITQ programs have also been implemented in Australia and the Netherlands. See
James E. Wilen, Renewable Resource Economists and Policy: What Differences Have We
Made?, 39 J. ENvTL. ECON. & MGMT. 306, 317 (2000) (noting that ITQ programs were
introduced in Australia and Netherlands after such programs appeared as "demonstration
programs" in New Zealand and Iceland); see also RICHARD G. NEWELL ET AL., FIsHING QUOTA
MARKETS 2 (Resources for the Future Discussion Paper 02-20, August 2002) (noting that
sixteen countries have adopted some form of ITQ system).
88. See GISSURARSON, supra note 85, at 29 (recognizing that an ITQ system counteracts
the tragedy of the commons and reduces overcapitalization and inefficiency); REPETTO, supra
note 86, at 2 (observing that several commentators recognize ITQ systems help reduce excessive
effort, increase efficiency, and are consistent with models of market-friendly environmentalism);
J. Annala, New Zealand's ITQ System: Have the First Eight Years Been a Success or Failure?,
6 REVIEWS IN FISH BIOLOGY AND FISHERIES 42, 46 (1996) (noting that several commentators
CONSER VA TION THROUGH COLLUSION
systems have created incentives for stewardship of fishery resources among
fishers.8 9 Each fisher has "an interest in cooperating to build the stocks,
because each will benefit from increased catches in the future." 90
Despite their success, ITQs are not without their flaws.91 Although ITQs
can generate substantial efficiency gains, they can produce unwelcome socio-
economic effects. In the United States, concerns about both the initial
allocation of quota shares and the impact of ITQ transfer on smaller fishing
communities has limited the adoption of ITQ systems. 92 These concerns led to
the adoption of a temporary moratorium on the adoption of ITQ systems in U.S.
waters93 and limitations on ITQ systems elsewhere. 94
concluded that New Zealand's Quota Management System reduced overfishing while improving
the economic returns to the fishing industry); Grafton et al., supra note 86, at 683 (arguing that
ITQ can lead to improvements in "allocative efficiency" and "technical efficiency"). Indeed, the
experience with ITQs has been that "the gains in efficiency are almost always greater than
expected, even by the most ardent supporters." Wilen, supra note 87, at 317; see also NEWELL
ET AL., supra note 87, at 2 (noting the generally positive assessment of ITQ systems).
89. Scott, supra note 32, at 47-48 (arguing that exclusivity gets a rights holder more
involved in improving the health, growth, or value of his stock, and will discourage poachers).
90. Crowley, supra note 76, at 4. This observation is not merely theoretical. In New
Zealand, for example, ITQs have given fishers an incentive to monitor fish catch and population
levels, and to ensure that government set catch limits are sufficiently stringent. "It's the first
group of fishers I've ever encountered who turned down the chance to take more fish," observed
New Zealand's Agriculture Minister of the effect of ITQs on fisher behavior. DE ALESSI, supra
note 46, at 99.
91. See DE ALESSI, supra note 46, at 43-45 (discussing problems with ITQs and
concluding that the main problem with ITQs is that they are not real private property rights and
therefore might stifle, inter alia, innovations and resource enhancement); U.S. GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INDIVIDUAL FISHING QUOTAS: BETTER INFORMATION COULD IMPROVE
PROGRAM MANAGEMENT, GAO-03-159, Dec. 2002, at 2 (noting that while ITQ programs "have
achieved many of the desired conservation and management benefits, such as helping to
stabilize fisheries, reducing excessive investment in fishing capacity, and improving safety,"
there are also concerns about "the fairness of quota allocations," potential consolidation, and the
impacts of ITQ systems on local fishing communities). See generally McCay, supra note 74.
92. Many of these concerns are summarized in McCay, supra note 74, at 7-10, and DE
ALESSI, supra note 46, at 45-47 (highlighting the different arguments posed against the
implementation of ITQs, and concluding many such arguments are unfounded); see also Scott
C. Matulich et al., Fishery Cooperatives as an Alternative to ITQs: Implications of the
American Fisheries Act, 16 MAR. REs. ECON. 1, 1 (2001) (noting the political resistance to the
adoption of ITQs).
93. See Sustainable Fisheries Act of 1996, Pub.L. 104-297, 110 Stat. 3576. The approval
of the moratorium stopped the implementation of ITQ programs covering Gulf of Mexico Red
Snapper and Pacific Sablefish, each of which had been approved by their respective regional
fishery management councils. See Criddle & Macinko, supra note 87, at 462 (discussing the
effects of the approval of the moratorium).
94. See DE ALESSI, supra note 46, at 46 (noting that the New Zealand quota system has
been criticized for excluding small-scale and independent fishers from fisheries). At the time of
this writing, Congress is expected to revisit the ITQ moratorium.
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While adoption of ITQ systems in the United States has been slow, there
have been private initiatives to allocate annual harvests among firms in catch-
limited fisheries so as to create quasi-property rights and capture the economic
and ecological benefits that result.9 In effect, individual fishers and firms have
joined together in an effort to create common property or de facto ITQ regimes
where governmental agencies have failed to act. Yet, as discussed below,
antitrust law can operate as a formidable obstacle to the implementation and
enforcement of such systems.96 Indeed, antitrust labels some conservation
arrangements as illegal collusion.
III. Antitrust: The Concern with Collusion
The aim of antitrust law is to protect consumers from anticompetitive
conduct that increases consumer prices. Archetypal anticompetitive conduct is
the imposition of market restraints that prevent price competition. Consider the
basic cartel of competitors who collectively agree to fix prices at levels above
those that would prevail in a competitive market. This sort of agreement harms
consumers by transferring wealth to producers (through the higher prices),
reducing output (because consumers will consume less at a higher price), and
reducing competitive pressures for efficiency and innovation (because the cartel
reduces competition among firms). The primary focus of antitrust enforcement
is on those activities and arrangements, such as price-fixing cartels, that harm
consumer welfare in this fashion. By preventing such arrangements, antitrust
law aims to benefit consumers by ensuring that competitive market pressures
restrain retail prices and foster innovation.
The principle federal antitrust law, the Sherman Anti-Trust Act,97 was
enacted in 1890 to break up "trusts."98 The Sherman Act prohibits contracts,
combinations, and conspiracies "in restraint of trade," as well as the
monopolization or attempted monopolization of any given market.99 These
provisions are primarily enforced by the U.S. Department of Justice. Under the
Clayton Act, however, any person who is injured by actions that are illegal
95. See infra Part V.E (discussing harvesting cooperatives).
96. See infra Part IV (discussing the effects of antitrust law on such efforts).
97. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2000).
98. See I PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF
ANTITRUST PRJNCIPLES AND T-EIR APPLICATION 101, at 8-9 (2d ed. 2002) (suggesting that the
framers of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act intended in part to "federalize" state common law
directed at trusts, but also intended to be much broader in scope).
99. 15 U.S.C. § 12.
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under federal antitrust law may file suit in federal district court and seek
recovery of "threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of the suit,
including a reasonable attorney's fee."' ° This provision creates a powerful
incentive for those who may have been harmed by alleged anticompetitive
conduct to seek private enforcement of antitrust laws in the courts.'0 '
One source of difficulty for antitrust law is that all economic agreements
have the potential to restrain trade to some degree.'02 Yet, some such
agreements may benefit consumers by increasing the efficiency of producing
firms, thereby reducing prices.'0 3 Antitrust law attempts to weigh the potential
pro-competitive effects of a given arrangement against its potential
anticompetitive effects. When it is unclear whether a given arrangement is
inherently pro- or anticompetitive, judges apply a standard called the "rule of
reason" which requires them to balance the probable off-setting impacts of the
arrangement. As described by Justice Brandeis, under the rule of reason courts
consider "whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps
thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even
destroy competition."'°4
To understand how anticompetitive behavior can have pro-competitive
effects, consider the simple example of a merger between two large firms in a
relatively concentrated industry. On the one hand, the combination of the two
firms may create a single large firm that has substantial market power within
the industry. If there are few competitors, the new, larger firm might be able to
raise prices above the competitive level, thereby harming consumers. On the
other hand, a single large firm may be more efficient than two smaller firms due
to economies of scale. The ability to spread fixed costs throughout a larger firm
may reduce the average cost of producing and supplying consumer goods and
100. Id. § 15.
101. See II AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 98,1 312d, at 39 (noting that Section 4 of
the Clayton Act provides a powerful financial incentive for private persons to enforce antitrust
laws).
102. See Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationary & Printing Co., 472 U.S.
284, 289 (1985) (stating that "every commercial agreement restrains trade" (citing Chicago Bd.
of Trade, 246 U.S. at 238)); Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231,238 (1918)
("Every agreement concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains. To bind, to restrain, is
of their very essence."); see also ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 28 (1978) ("The
integration of economic activities, which is indispensable to productive efficiency, always
involves the implicit elimination of actual or potential competition.").
103. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 9-32 (2nd ed. 2001) (discussing the costs
and benefits of monopoly).
104. Chicago Bd. of Trade, 246 U.S. at 238.
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services. In some cases, such efficiency gains may offset the consumer losses
resulting from the reduction of competition within the industry.'05
Due to information problems, it is not always possible for judges or
government regulators to determine which actions, combinations, or
arrangements are anticompetitive. For this reason, courts apply decision rules
that define certain actions or types of agreements to be anticompetitive per se.
As the Supreme Court explained in Northern Pacific Railway v. United
States: 1
06
[T]here are certain agreements or practices which because of their
pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are
conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without
elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or the business
excuse for their use.
107
Adoption of a per se rule permits the court to make a categorical judgment
as to the permissibility of a given business practice without engaging in a long,
drawn-out, potentially expensive and somewhat uncertain analysis of the
specific practice and its context.'0 8 As traditionally applied by the courts, the
decision to apply a per se rule reflects a conclusion that the conduct in question
does little or nothing to increase social welfare.' °9 Such ajudgment is typically
applied to agreements between competitors-so-called "horizontal"
arrangements-which explicitly limit production or control prices. These are
presumptively unlawful because courts assume that the primary effect of such
arrangements is to reduce competition." 0
105. See POSNER, supra note 103, at 28 (suggesting that a single firm operates more
efficiently in a market considerably smaller in relation to the efficient scale of production than if
there existed competing firms).
106. N. Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
107. Id. at 5.
108. See Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationary & Printing Co., 472 U.S.
284, 289 (1985) (noting that the per se approach makes "categorical judgments with respect to
certain business practices that have proved to be predominantly anticompetitive" and "thereby
avoid[s] the significant costs in business certainty and litigation efficiency" of a more in-depth
analysis (internal quotations omitted)).
109. See Peter M. Gerhart, The Supreme Court and Antitrust Analysis: The (Near)
Triumph of the Chicago School, 10 Sup. CT. REV. 319,330 (1982) (noting that before Arizona
v. Maricopa County Medical Society, 457 U.S. 332 (1982), a court's decision to apply the per se
rule meant the conduct had no redeeming virtues).
110. "Horizontal" arrangements are distinguished from "vertical" arrangements--such as
those between producers and suppliers in a given market. See United States v. Topco Assoc.,
405 U.S. 596, 609 (1972) (holding that an agreement among retailers placing territorial
restrictions on the sealing of certain products was a horizontal restraint and therefore was a per
se violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act).
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Perhaps the most obvious per se violation of antitrust laws is the creation
or maintenance of a price-fixing cartel. As the Supreme Court explained in
United States v. Socony- Vacuum Oil Co.,"'
[T]his Court has consistently and without deviation adhered to the principle
that price-fixing agreements are unlawfulper se under the Sherman Act and
that no showing of so-called competitive abuses or evils which those
agreements were designed to eliminate or alleviate may be interposed as a
defense ... .t12 Under the Sherman Act a combination formed for the
purpose and with the effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or
stabilizing the Brice of a commodity in interstate or foreign commerce is
illegal per se.
It is important to note that the agreement in question need not explicitly
concern price. Agreements that restrain output are presumed to have this effect
and are treated similarly.' 
14
Agreements among competitors to set prices are not the only per se
antitrust violations."' Historically, agreements among competitors to allocate
set territories and engage in group boycotts," 6 and concerted refusals to deal, 17
have also been afforded per se treatment. When such "horizontal" restraints are
involved, there is no need to show that the agreement or action actually had an
anticompetitive effect or otherwise harmed consumer welfare. The negative
impact is presumed due to the nature of the restraint.
The application of per se rules in the context of resource conservation is a
potential problem because what antitrust enforcers fear-agreements which
I 11. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
112. Id. at 218.
113. Id. at 223.
114. See XI AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 98, 1805, at Ill (noting agreements
among rivals to use output contracts are illegal per se unless limited to inputs supplying a
production joint venture).
115. It should be noted that the precise contours of the line dividing the per se rule from
the rule of reason is the subject of academic debate. See infra notes 339-41 and accompanying
text (discussing the trend of courts towards a less bright line approach to antitrust analysis).
116. See United States v. Topco Assoc., 405 U.S. 596,601 (1972) (describing the boycott
practices at issue). But see Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, 792 F.2d 210,226
(D.C. Cir. 1986) (noting that the rule against all horizontal restraints has been "effectively
overruled" by subsequent cases).
117. See Kor's Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S., 207, 212-13 (1959) (finding
that group boycotts, or concerted refusals by traders to deal with other traders, are forbidden
because such boycotts destroy the freedom of traders and have a monopolistic tendency). But
see Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationary & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284,295
(1985) (noting that although group boycotts are usually forbidden, the per se rule will not
always operate against every cooperative activity involving a restraint or exclusion).
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restrain output-is precisely what conservation demands. When a monopolist
or cartel restricts output, it is harmful to consumers because it tends to increase
prices and reduce consumer welfare. When a conservationist reduces output,
however, it can be beneficial to consumers because it sustains a valuable
resource. Conservation of a depletable resource requires limiting consumption.
Such limits will tend to increase prices by lowering the market supply of the
resource, while at the same time preventing future price increases by ensuring a
long-term supply of the resource in question. By reducing consumption in the
short run, conservation can actually increase consumption in the long run-and
therefore enhance consumer welfare. Agreements among resource users may
also help to overcome free rider problems or otherwise facilitate beneficial
cooperation." 8 In this sense, such agreements are efficient, even if they
increase price or reduce output, as they address some of the inefficiencies
resulting from the existence of a common pool resource." 9 Nonetheless,
conservation agreements can run afoul of antitrust law's per se prohibitions.
Even the rule of reason could penalize valuable conservation measures.
Courts applying the rule of reason consider offsetting efficiencies from
otherwise anticompetitive arrangements, such as the creation of economies of
scale or the elimination of free rider problems. 20  Yet, courts have not
considered the ancillary conservation benefits of otherwise anticompetitive
conduct, such as the creation of a horizontal arrangement to limit consumption
of a common pool resource. As a result, antitrust law may be inhibiting the
evolution and development of voluntary associations and community-based
conservation measures that conserve marine resources.
IV. Collusion and Cooperation in the Marine Commons
What conservation demands, antitrust condemns. Resource conservation
requires limiting consumption to sustainable levels. The number of fish caught
118. Antitrust cases such as United States v. Sealy, 388 U.S. 350 (1967) are illustrative of
beneficial horizontal arrangements that served to facilitate coordination and reduce free-riding
within an industry but nonetheless have been struck down under the per se rule. See Box,
supra note 102, at 270 (stating that Sealy "illustrates both the law's uneasiness and the needless
destruction of an efficiency-creating system of ancillary restraints").
119. As Areeda notes, some restraints may "actually move[] market performance close to
the competitive result. Rather than suppressing competition, offsetting a 'market failure'
promotes competitive results." PHILLIP E. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW § 1504, at 383 (1978).
120. See Gerhart, supra note 109, at 334-40 (analyzing cases that utilize the rule of reason
instead of the per se rule in instances where anticompetitive agreements promoted an integration
to efficiency or involved externalities and free rider problems).
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in a given season cannot be greater than the regenerative capacity of the fishery
or fish populations will decline. Fishery output must be restricted. Yet,
antitrust law is inherently suspect of private arrangements that restrict output.
When harvests are restricted, prices will increase above competitive levels. In
economic terms, conservation may yield monopoly rents for producers. Private
actors who seek to protect environmental resources by agreeing to limit their
exploitation of the resource are doing precisely what antitrust law forbids.
From the perspective of resource conservation, we recognize the value of
conserving a natural resource by restraining consumption to sustainable levels.
From the antitrust perspective, any agreement or association that seeks to
restrict output or otherwise raise prices above their competitive levels is a
pernicious influence on otherwise competitive markets. Professor Yandle
observes, "Successful cooperative efforts to conserve a common-access
resource yield an increase in wealth and social well-being whereas it is widely
argued that collusive efforts to monopolize markets yield a net reduction in
social well-being while redistributing wealth from consumers to producers." 2'
While conservation and antitrust enforcement both purport to improve human
welfare, in the commons they conflict.
Where formal private property institutions are absent, users of marine
commons may nonetheless seek to organize themselves into communities or
associations, what could be called "conservation cartels," to manage and
maintain the marine commons. In the commercial context, these associations
often organize so as to limit the catch. The limits are often indirect, achieved
through the setting of minimum prices or the exclusion of outsiders, as the
impetus for such measures is higher profit for the fishery, rather than its
sustainable utilization over time, and enforcement costs preclude more direct
measures. Despite the motivation that drives the formation of such
associations, the impact on the fishery is the same. 122 Private associations that
limit the catch can help ensure the fishing practices remain sustainable over
time. Nonetheless, such environmentally beneficial arrangements are subject to
antitrust prosecution.
121. Bruce Yandle, Antitrust and the Commons: Cooperation or Collusion?, 3 THE
INDEPENDENT REV. 37, 38 (1998).
122. The environmental benefits of a given conservation cartel will be a function of the
extent to which the arrangement is successful at reducing the total catch to a sustainable level,
not the intention of those who organize or maintain the cartel. See ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY
INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 26-27 (R.H. Campbell et al. eds.,
1976) ("It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect
our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest.").
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Beginning in the late 1930s, there were several private and public
prosecutions of fishermen's unions and other cooperative efforts to limit fishery
exploitation. While in many, if not all, of these cases the motivation for
adopting measures to limit catches was pecuniary-the fishers sought higher
prices for their goods-the conservation potential of such arrangements was
evident. At a time when fishery conservation had yet to become a matter of
great public concern, fishers adopted means to limit the fish catch to sustainable
levels.'23 Despite these potential conservation benefits, the conservation cartels
were uniformly held per se illegal arrangements under the Sherman Anti-Trust
Act. Today, antitrust law continues to limit collaboration among fishers in
regulated fisheries, although some fishing cooperatives have escaped antitrust
condemnation.
A. Gulf Coast Shrimpers
In the 1930s, shrimpers and oystermen operating along the Mississippi
coast sought to increase their revenues by controlling prices and limiting entry.
For this purpose, they created the Gulf Coast Shrimpers' and Oystermen's
Association (GCSOA). 24 Headquartered in Biloxi, the GCSOA was made up
of fishing boat captains and crews operating out of Mississippi ports. The
GCSOA entered into contracts with local shrimp and oyster packers and
canners whereby all association members would sell their shrimp and oyster
catch to contracting packers and canners. In return, the packers and canners
agreed to purchase all of the catch offered by association members, and to
provide other services. 25 Some of the packers owned boats of their own that
also abided by the association's rules.
The federal government brought suit against the GCSOA for Sherman Act
violations. Specifically, the government adduced evidence that the association
barred its members from selling shrimp and oysters below set prices, and barred
participating packers and canners from purchasing catches below the set price,
as well as from purchasing the catch of nonmember fishers. 2 Violators were
subject to fines, suspension of membership, and forfeiture of proceeds from the
123. Indeed, at the time these arrangements were adopted, the modem environmental
movement had yet to emerge and environmental problems, generally, were not matters of great
public concern.
124. See Gulf Coast Shrimpers & Oystermans Ass'n v. United States, 236 F.2d 658,660-
61 (5th Cir. 1956) (detailing briefly the formation of GCSOA, how it operated, and its purpose).
125. Id.
126. Id. at661.
CONSER VA TION THROUGH COLLUSION
offending catch. The GCSOA encouraged picketing and boycotting of
nonparticipating packers and canners. On this evidence, the GCSOA and
several of its officers were found guilty of antitrust violations.'27
Although the GCSOA engaged in proscribed conduct, it is not at all clear
that the union's activities were anticompetitive or otherwise harmed consumer
welfare. Professors Johnson and Libecap found that the union explicitly sought
to alter the harvesting practices of its members. 12  The union set a floor on
shrimp prices based upon shrimp size, specifically the number of tails per
pound. This price was generally greater than prevailing market prices for small
shrimp. In this fashion, the union was able to discourage the harvesting of
smaller shrimp. As a result, shrimpers shifted their harvests to later in the
season when shrimp are larger and worth more. 129 This shift also served to
lessen the overall shrimp catch, as shrimpers were not driven to catch more,
lower-value shrimp to cover their expenses. 30 Interestingly enough, union
price floors for larger shrimp "were generally at or below" the prevailing
market price, suggesting that the challenged arrangements did not have an
anticompetitive effect. 
31
Until the arrangement was struck down, it was apparently successful at
discouraging the harvesting and sale of smaller, less-mature shrimp in
Mississippi. Mississippi shrimp prices were generally higher than those in
neighboring Louisiana, reflecting the greater proportion of larger shrimp.'32
From this evidence, Professor Libecap concludes "private group regulations of
fisheries could be an alternative to government regulation if that option were
127. See id. at 665 (finding the government's evidence was sufficient to present a jury
question regarding violations of the Sherman Act and upholding the jury verdict of guilty).
128. See LIBECAP, supra note 7, at 88 (noting that the transcript of the Gulf Coast case
indicates the actions of the union were intended to impact the harvest practices of the members);
Ronald N. Johnson & Gary D. Libecap, Contracting Problems and Regulation: The Case of the
Fishery, 21 AM. ECON. REv. 1005, 1008 (1982) (arguing that the Gulf Coast transcript and
interviews of persons knowledgeable of the union suggest that price-fixing directed efforts
toward larger, more valuable shrimp).
129. See LmBECAP, supra note 7, at 88-89 (describing how the association implemented a
price flow in such a way that it directed harvests to later in the season when larger, more
valuable shrimp were available).
130. See E. Paul Durrenberger, Psychology, Unions, and the Law: Folk Models and the
History ofShrimpers'Unions in Mississippi, 51 HuMAN ORG. 151, 152 (1992) (highlighting the
fact that shrimpers had to redouble their efforts in the 1950s as expenses increased considerably
while domestic prices dropped).
131. LIBECAP, supra note 7, at 89.
132. Id.
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politically acceptable."' 133  It was not, and the GCSOA was successfully
prosecuted for violating the Sherman Act. 1
3 4
Twenty-five years later, shrimpers in Texas sought to set prices and
informally limit the number of shrimp boats operating in Galveston Bay and
San Antonio Bay. Local shrimpers were concerned that an influx of
Vietnamese refugees would increase harvest levels and drive down prices.'35
The shrimpers reportedly agreed with Vietnamese refugees who had already
settled in the Galveston Bay area to set prices and discourage further settlement
in the area. The Federal Trade Commission considered these agreements, at
least one of which included explicit price terms, to be in violation of the
Sherman Act. ' 36 Thus, the agreements were never enforced. Local shrimpers
nonetheless shared information about shrimp locations so as to disadvantage,
and potentially discourage, newcomers into the bay shrimp fisheries.
37
It is often noted that cooperation in the marine commons is no easy thing.
Independent boat owners and operators may have competing interests and are
difficult to organize. Collective action in domestic commercial fisheries is
relatively rare. An individualistic culture among fishermen may also bear some
of the blame. Shrimpers in the Gulf of Mexico are particularly notorious for
their individualistic mindset. "You just can't organize shrimpers," says one
133. Id. at 90. Anthony Scott similarly observes that the GCSOA "did succeed for a while
in regulating harvesting (mesh size and closed seasons). But, ultimately it did not succeed in
regulating entry, effort or individual catches." Anthony Scott, Obstacles to Fishery Self
Government, 8 MARrNE RES. ECON. 187, 190 (1993). Of course, this failure may have been due,
in part, to the antitrust prosecution.
134. See Gulf Coast Shrimpers & Oystermans Ass'n v. United States, 236 F.2d 658,662-
65 (5th Cir. 1956) (holding that the indictment and evidence against the GCSOA defendants
were sufficient and that the trial court's charge to the jury was adequate, thereby upholding the
jury verdict finding the defendants guilty of engaging in a combination or conspiracy in restraint
of trade in violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act).
135. In some cases, opposition to the influx of Vietnamese immigrants was grounded in
local racist sentiment and resulted in violence. See, e.g., Vietnamese Fishermen's Ass'n v.
Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, 518 F. Supp. 993, 1015-17 (S.D. Tex. 1981) (finding that
defendants' provocative statements and overt acts created a situation that predictably would
result in unlawful intimidation and acts of violence and granting a preliminary injunction to
enjoin the defendants from using self-help tactics, including threats of violence and
intimidation). The court also stated that "clearly, it is in the public interest to enjoin ... threats
of violence and intimidation and permit individuals to pursue their chosen occupation free of
racial animus." Id. at 1016-17.
136. See Johnson & Libecap, supra note 128, at 1007 (noting that the FTC considered
these agreements in violation of antitrust laws, in part because these agreements limited the
number of boats in the Texas bays).
137. See id. (noting that this sharing of information is limited to small cliques so as to
increase the cost of entry to newcomers who are denied access to this information).
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shrimping captain. 138  Yet, the history of the GCSOA suggests another
possibility. Shrimpers might not organize because when they sought to
organize in the 1940s and 1950s in order to decrease the size, but increase the
quality and value, of local shrimp catches, they were prosecuted for violations
of federal antitrust laws. 139 Unions were fined and, in at least one case, their
officers were sent to jail.' 40 Thus, the failure of shrimpers' unions in the Gulf
may not be "due to any peculiar psychology of fishermen but because it is
against the law."
14 1
B. Breaking the Unions
Gulf Coast Shrimpers was not an isolated case. In the 1930s and 1940s
there were several antitrust actions against fishers' unions throughout the
country. In some cases the suits were brought by government authorities. In
others, private plaintiffs used the antitrust statutes to seek treble damages
against the defendants. 142 In case after case, courts found against the fishers'
associations and condemned their cooperative efforts as collusive attempts to
restrain trade in seafood products.
In California, the federal government successfully prosecuted Local 36 of
the International Fishermen & Allied Workers of America for conspiracy to
"restrain trade" in "one of the most highly important and highly perishable
articles of food given to mankind, namely fresh fish and crustaceans, coming
into 'fishing ports' for sale to dealers."' 43 Approximately 75% of the fishers
operating out of southern California were members of Local 36.'" Members of
the union were convicted of setting minimum prices for which they would sell
seafood to local dealers, agreeing to sell their catch solely to those dealers who
138. Durrenberger, supra note 130, at 151.
139. See generally Gulf Coast Shrimpers & Oystermans Ass'n v. United States, 236 F.2d
658 (5th Cir. 1956) (describing the case of a shrimpers association prosecuted for violating
antitrust laws).
140. See Durrenberger, supra note 130, at 153 (discussing a case in which ajudge found a
Biloxi shrimpers' union in violation of antitrust laws and fined the union $2,500 and sentenced
its officers to nine months in jail).
141. Id.atl5l.
142. Under Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2000), any person who is injured
by actions which are illegal under federal antitrust law may file suit in federal district court and
seek recovery of "threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of the suit, including a
reasonable attorney's fee."
143. Local 36 of Int'l Fishermen & Allied Workers of Am. v. United States, 177 F.2d 320,
324 (9th Cir. 1949).
144. Id.
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would contract with the union, and engaging in various tactics, including
boycotts and picketing, to induce dealers to contract with the union. 45 The
union ultimately sought to prevent nonmembers from fishing off the coast of
southern California and selling their catch in southern California ports, thereby
enabling the union to control the catch and charge higher prices. 146 Local 36,
like the union defendants in most of the fishery cases, unsuccessfully sought to
demonstrate that fishers' unions were subject to antitrust law exemptions
provided to labor unions and certain types of agricultural cooperatives,
including fishing cooperatives.1
47
The indictment of Local 36 acknowledged that "[e]xcept for the illegal
restraints described hereinafter, a much greater volume of fresh fish and
crustaceans would have been brought to the fishing ports... and sold,
processed and distributed."'4 Regardless of whether the restrictions were
adopted with conservation in mind, they had the same effect as would have
conservation measures on the fishery: they reduced the volume of fish
caught. 149 Yet, this reduction was part of Local 36's violation. By reducing
output, Local 36 may have been helping to conserve fisheries off the Pacific
Coast, but they were also "prevent[ing] the public in the territorial area from
receiving a normal and usual supply of fresh fish" and maintaining
noncompetitive prices.5 Whether this reduction had broader economic
impacts on fish markets was immaterial, as was whether the contract price was
"'reasonable." As the court noted, "[U]nless specifically authorized by
legislation, a conspiracy to fix prices is in and of itself a violation" of the
Sherman Act."' Conservation or other benefits were immaterial: "No inquiry
as to substantiality, directness, effectiveness, or reasonableness of restraint is
145. Id. at 325.
146. Id.
147. See id. at 326 (rejecting the union's argument that its members acted as working
original producers who fixed prices for products of their own labor and thus exempt from
Clayton Act and Norris-La Guardia Act because the court found an employer-employee
relationship between the dealers and fishermen).
148. Id. at 325. It should be noted that Local 36, as part of its defense, claimed that the
ultimate impact of its agreements would be to reduce fish waste, as well as to increase fish
production in the affected fisheries. See id. at 337 (requesting ajury charge that instructed the
jury to weigh the state laws preventing waste of fish and to consider whether the fishermen's
intentions were to increase or decrease fish production through their agreements).
149. Id.
150. Id. at 325.
151. Id. at 331.
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permitted."' 5 2 Similarly, the union's "exclusion of producers and dealers from
the market" was a per se antitrust violation "in and of itself."' 5
3
That collusive arrangements among fishers and processors could have
positive environmental impacts has been acknowledged by reviewing courts-
and explicitly deemed irrelevant for purposes of the antitrust analysis. As the
court held in Manaka v. Monterey Sardine Industries:
5 4
Such an association as that of the boat owners is not freed from the
restrictive provisions of the anti-trust act, because they profess in the
interest of conservation of important food fish to regulate the price and the
manner of taking such fish "unauthorized by legislation and uncontrolled by
proper authority." 
5 5
While the government may sanction collective efforts to control output or
increase prices, courts deemed independent conservation efforts tantamount to
the defendant unions "taking the law into their own hands."'
'5 6
That fishery users are driven by their pursuit of profit to create
associations and adopt measures that could facilitate the long-term conservation
of ocean fisheries is not, as of yet, a consideration in the application of antitrust
laws. Rather, as the Supreme Court noted in another context, "The interest of
the public in the preservation of competition is the primary consideration." 157
Indeed, some courts viewed private cooperative efforts to reduce fish harvests
as presumptively suspect. In Columbia River Packers Association v. Hinton,158
another private antitrust action for damages against the Pacific Coast
Fishermen's Union, the court suggested that to allow private associations to
conserve fish stocks without government approval would unduly threaten the
public's right to have fish:
In any year when defendant's members did not "choose to fish", how would
the consuming public get its needs of salmon, tuna, and other marine
products from North Pacific waters? Since the union's contract does not
guarantee a supply of fish, where would the canneries get fish, having
agreed to look to the union for their sole supply? Surely reasonable men
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Manaka v. Monterey Sardine Indus., Inc., 41 F. Supp. 531 (N.D. Cal. 1941).
155. Id. at 534.
156. Columbia River Packers Ass'n v. Hinton, 34 F. Supp. 970, 975 n.3 (D. Or. 1939).
157. Paramount Famous Lasky Corp. v. United States, 282 U.S. 30, 44 (1930).
Environmental concerns, on the other hand, were not a significant public policy consideration at
the time.
158. Columbia River Packers Ass'n v. Hinton, 34 F. Supp. 970 (D. Or. 1939).
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will agree that the public's interest in an important item of food supply
should not be put in such jeopardy.1
59
Left out of the court's analysis is any consideration of where the "consuming
public" might "get its needs" of fish should unrestrained harvests produce
unsustainable levels of consumption in Pacific fisheries. 160 Surely high-priced
fish are preferable to no fish at all.
Associations of boat owners and fishing crews were also subject to
potential antitrust actions under state law. The Commonwealth of
Massachusetts successfully enjoined the Atlantic Fishermen's Union and its
members from continuing certain practices that the Commonwealth deemed to
be anticompetitive under state law.16' The union was accused of conspiring to
"control completely not only the catching but the marketing and price" of all
fish caught by boats operating out of Gloucester, Boston, and New Bedford,
Massachusetts by operating a "selling room" through which all union members
were required to sell their catch.' 62 The stated purpose of the union was to
improve working conditions and ensure that its members received a "fair share
of the profits of our labor commensurate with the dangers and hardships" of
fishing.' 63  Most boat crews operating out of Massachusetts at the time
consisted of the union's members.1'4
Among other things, the union was accused of maintaining super-
competitive fish prices by "limiting the quantities of fresh fish which could be
brought into the three ports named.' 65 Specifically, the union adopted rules
limiting the volume of fish of various species that fishers could bring in by a
boat on each trip, and setting minimum prices for fish sales. According to the
Massachusetts trial court, these "artificial[]" limitations on fish supplies made it
"probable" that "fish cost more to the Massachusetts buyer and the
159. Id. at 975.
160. The district court's decision in Columbia River Packers was initially reversed on
appeal on the grounds that the case involved a "labor dispute" between workers (the boatowners
and crews belonging to the union) and employers (the packers), the district court lacked
jurisdiction under the Norris-LaGuardia Act. Hinton v. Columbia River Packers Ass'n, 117
F.2d 310 (9th Cir. 1941). The Supreme Court reversed, finding the dispute one between "fish
buyers" and "fish sellers" rather than workers and employers, but made no comment on the other
antitrust or conservation aspects of the case. Columbia River Packers Ass'n v. Hinton, 315 U.S.
143,147 (1942).
161. See Commonwealth v. McHugh, 93 N.E.2d 751, 755 (Mass. 1950) (explaining that
the practice at issue violated state law).
162. Id.
163. Id. at 756.
164. Id. at 757.
165. Id. at 755.
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Massachusetts ultimate consumer" than it would otherwise. 166  The
Massachusetts Supreme Court concurred, finding that the union's "direct and
intentional limitation of total production and the arbitrary fixing of prices" was
unlawful, without even needing to consider "whether prices have actually
reached a level which by some standard can be pronounced unreasonable."'
167
The positive environmental benefits of reducing fish catches off the shores of
Massachusetts were not considered.
Notwithstanding the successful state prosecution of the Atlantic
Fishermen's Union's anticompetitive conduct, Patrick McHugh, an officer of
the union, was subsequently subject to federal prosecution for his
anticompetitive actions under the Sherman Act. 168 In this case, the court noted
that McHugh's actions, through the union, "effectively limited the quantity and
species of fish landed in New Bedford .... Had it not been for defendants'
illegal restraints, a 'much greater' volume of scallops and other fish would have
been brought into and sold in the port of New Bedford."'169 Again, the court did
not consider that such actions might facilitate the long-run conservation of local
fisheries.
Not all of the antitrust challenges to fishers' associations had clear
conservation implications. In Hawaii, the Hawaiian Tuna Packers, Ltd. (HTP)
sued Local 150 of the International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's
Union (ILWU) for conspiring to monopolize the local tuna market and control
tuna prices. 170  HTP was the only tuna cannery on the then-territory of
Hawaii.'17 It contracted with several boatowners to take in their tuna catch, sell
fresh tuna in the Oahu market, and then purchase any remaining surplus for
canning purposes. 172 Of the thirteen boatowners in Oahu, HTP had ten under
contract at the time of the suit. 73 Prior to the creation of the union, the price
paid by HTP for tuna was determined by mainland fish prices.1
7
4
166. See id. at 758 (detailing the findings of the trial court).
167. Id. at 760.
168. See McHugh v. United States, 230 F.2d 252, 254 (1 st Cir. 1956) (finding that, inter
alia, the indictment was sufficient and therefore upholding the District Court'sjudgment entered
following a plea to a two-charge indictment alleging defendant, inter alia, had combined and
conspired to restrain trade in violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act).
169. Id. at 254.
170. See Hawaiian Tuna Packers Ltd. v. Int'l Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union,
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Beginning in 1946, the ILWU began to organize the crewmembers of the
Oahu fishing boats, and some of the boatowners, into a union.1 75 Once Local
150 was created, it sought to set minimum prices for tuna caught and sold by or
to HTP. 176 When HTP refused to agree to the contract, Local 150 organized a
work stoppage and threatened the crews of other boats that continued to deal
with HTP.177 HTP sued, and the court found Local 150 in violation of the
Sherman Act. Like Local 36 in California, Local 150 committed a per se
antitrust violation by conspiring to fix prices and thereby creating an
unreasonable restraint on trade. 
78
Unlike in Gulf Coast Shrimpers or Local 36, Local 150's actions might
not have reduced fishing pressure on the Hawaiian tuna fishery or otherwise
served conservation goals. No doubt harvests were substantially lower during
the boycott of HTP, but this was only a temporary measure. According to the
court's decision, Local 150 believed that demand for tuna in Oahu would be
relatively inelastic and unresponsive to increases in price. 79 As a result, HTP
would be able to pass on higher tuna prices without a significant loss in sales.
The published opinion in the case does not provide sufficient information with
which to assess this claim.
It should be noted that whether or not the initial agreement had immediate
conservation implications, had Local 150's efforts been allowed, perhaps as
falling under the exemption provided for certain types of cooperatives, a viable
collective institution may have remained to implement conservation measures
should the need arise. It is certainly possible that the prosecution of
fishermen's associations in times of relative abundance in ocean fisheries left
fisheries more vulnerable to eventual depletion. The cumulative effect of the
antitrust cases against fishers' unions was to constrain the ability of boatowners
and their crews to create private associations for the management, maintenance,
and even conservation of marine resources. Even where such agreements might
conceivably pass legal muster, the threat of private antitrust suits for treble





177. Id. at 564.
178. See id. at 565 (finding that plaintiff satisfactorily pleaded a case alleging that
defendants conspired to fix fish prices in violation of the Sherman Act as an unreasonable
restraint of trade and thus denying defendant's motion to dismiss).
179. See id. at 563 (asserting that the union attempted to persuade the plaintiffs into
accepting the fixed price by suggesting the plaintiff could resell at whatever price it pleased).
180. Yandle, supra note 121, at 50 ("The mere threat of Antitrust investigation adds
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Union efforts were not perfect-most were clearly focused more on
maximizing receipts for their members than on fishery conservation-but the
effect was to inhibit the development of nongovernmental cooperative
management structures that could have addressed fishery problems. That the
unions' motivations were pecuniary or otherwise "impure" should be of little
consequence; Adam Smith's "invisible hand" does not depend on noble
intentions but self-interest.1 8 From a conservation perspective, what matters is
whether institutional arrangements developed--or could have developed-to
ensure sustainable utilization of the resource. Congress would not enact the
Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act' 82 for another two
decades, and that act proved largely ineffective, as have fishery regulations
generally.183 It is possible that collusive fishery organizations, whatever their
costs to consumers, would have done more to conserve marine resources and
ensure their long-term supply. Yet, by declaring such conservation cartels
illegal per se, courts effectively foreclosed any experimentation with such
approaches to fishery conservation.
18 4
C. Informal Associations
Not all collective arrangements among fishers are formalized in contracts.
To the contrary, "there is well-documented evidence of coastal fishers
sustaining a viable fishery by implementing their own system of rules
governing access and use."' 85 Particularly in local, homogeneous communities,
customs and cultural norms may facilitate cooperation among otherwise-
competing firms or individuals. 8 6 Such norms, although not set down in
writing or otherwise formalized into law, "are capable of creating rules that
another chilling breeze to the already challenging climate for forming community organizations
to conserve natural resources.").
181. See SMITH, supra note 122, at 26-27 ("It is not from the benevolence of the butcher,
the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest.").
182. Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-82 (2000).
183. See supra notes 61-78 and accompanying text (describing deficiencies of
conventional fishery regulations).
184. See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits ofAntitrust, 63 TEx. L. REv. 1, 2 (1984) ("Ifthe
court errs by condemning a beneficial practice, the benefits may be lost for good. Any other
firm that uses the condemned practice faces sanctions in the name of stare decisis, no matter the
benefits.").
185. Donald R. Leal, Community-run Fisheries: Preventing the Tragedy of the Commons,
in TAKING OWNERSHIP: PROPERTY RIGHTS AND FISHERY MANAGEMENTON THE ATLANTIC COAST
183,184 (Brian L. Crowley ed., 1996).
186. See generally OSTROM, supra note 32.
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establish property rights."' 8 7 Professor Ellickson notes that "members of a
close-knit group develop and maintain norms whose content serves to
maximize the aggregate welfare that members obtain in their workaday affairs
with one another."'88 The "close-knit" nature of the group can arise from
cultural homogeneity, such as that which one may find in an isolated
community, like a small fishing village. 89 The closeness may also be the result
of repeated interactions arising from shared occupations or experiences.' 90 In
the fishery context, such contract-facilitating norms are more likely in those
industries, areas, and communities in which the participants have an extended
course of dealing.
In practice, such norms may serve to create informal associations or
groups that operate much like more formal cooperatives. In many earlier
societies, norms and informal rules helped prevent the "tragedy of the
commons" in common pastures and the like.' 9' Today, such informal rules
continue to regulate the use of common resources much as formal legal rules.
Informal rules and customs can be formalized over time, but this need not be
the case. Professor Ellickson's work on how traditional whaling communities
developed substantive norms governing the right to capture and recover whale
carcasses is one example of the evolution and eventual formalization of such
rules.19 2 While these rules were informal and customary, the existence of such
rules was eventually recognized by courts in seeking to adjudicate disputes
among whalers. 193
187. ROBERT ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 203
(1991).
188. Id. at 167. Wealth-maximizing norms are those norms which "minimize the members'
objective sum of(1) transaction costs and (2) deadweight losses arising from failures to exploit
potential gains from trade." 1d. at 184.
189. See Terry L. Anderson & Bishop Grewell, Property Rights Solutionsfor the Global
Commons: Bottom-Up or Top-Down, 10 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'y F. 73, 79 (1999)
("[H]omogeneity provides norms that can help resolve conflicts in closely knit groups.").
190. For example, Jonathan Macey suggests that it is "repeated interactions, not the closely
knit nature of the groups, that lead to cooperation." Jonathan R. Macey, Public and Private
Ordering and the Production of Legitimate and Illegitimate Legal Rules, 82 CORNELL L. REV.
1123, 1131 (1997). It is also worth noting that the dividing line between contract and "custom"
is often illusory. As Cheung notes, "Some asserted 'customs' are, in fact, market practices in
which the contractual terms are not obvious." Steven N.S. Cheung, The Structure ofa Contract
and the Theory ofa Non-Exclusive Resource, 13 J.L. & ECON. 49, 57 n. 16 (1970).
191. See generally OSTROM, supra note 32; Susan Jane Buck Cox, No Tragedy on the
Commons, 7 ENVTL. ETtucs 49 (1985).
192. Robert C. Ellickson, A Hypothesis of Wealth-Maximizing Norms: Evidence from the
Whaling Industry, 5 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 83, 88 (1989) (introducing three basic utilitarian norms
developed by whalers).
193. See, e.g., Swift v. Gifford, 23 F. Cas. 558 (D. Mass. 1872) (recognizing and upholding
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In Maine, lobstermen have effectively divided local lobster fisheries into
discrete territories and informally agreed to limit the lobster catch.' 94 So-called
"harbor gangs" enforce these boundaries among themselves and against
outsiders. 195 Only gang members are allowed to harvest lobsters in designated
areas. There is no formal legal prohibition on outsiders fishing in gang
territories, but the boundaries are defended through custom and self-help.
196
The regime exists "only because of the benign neglect of the state.'0
97
Although they are informal, these arrangements effectively create local
monopolies that limit entry and consumption.'98 The successful enforcement of
such arrangements reduces overcapitalization and increases fishery incomes in
what would otherwise be open-access fisheries. Political developments have
weakened some of the territorial claims, but where the informal territories are
enforced, lobster catch productivity is higher and fishing pressure is reduced.' 99
While such informal systems can be effective in some circumstances, they
are vulnerable to political, economic, and social change. A particular weakness
of such systems is that they have difficulty with outsiders. °° Informal systems
work only so long as all those participating understand the common rules, or if
the informal entity has a means of excluding outsiders or enforcing its internal
rules. Lobstering territories may be enforced among members of a close-knit
community through customs and norms. Those who have participated in the
lobster fishery for years understand the informal rules and the expectations of
others within the community. Enforcing territory against outsiders is more
whalers' custom).
194. See generally James M. Acheson, The Lobster Fiefs Revisited, in THE QUESTION OF
THE COMMONS 63 (Bonnie J. McKay & James M. Acheson eds., 1987) (noting the effectiveness
of the Maine lobstermen's territorial arrangements).
195. See id. at 40-41 (noting that "[o]nce a new fisherman has gained admission to a
'harbor gang', he is ordinarily allowed to go fishing only in the tradition territory of that harbor"
and discussing the consequences of territorial boundary violations imposed by fellow
lobstermen (citations omitted)); Donald R. Leal, Cooperating in the Commons: Case Studies in
Community Fisheries, in WHO OwNs THE ENviRONmENT? 283,290-91 (P.J. Hill & R.E. Meiners
eds., 1998) (discussing the extralegal means employed by Maine fishermen in order to defend
their claimed area).
196. See Acheson, supra note 194, at 40 ("From the legal view, anyone who has a license
can go lobster fishing anywhere. In reality far more is required.").
197. Id. at 80.
198. See Gordon, supra note 34, at 134 (stating that some lobstermen in the Atlantic "have
banded together into a local monopoly, preventing entry and controlling their own operations").
199. See Acheson, supra note 194, at 52 ("We obtained unmistakable evidence that
reduced fishing effort in the perimeter-defended areas has both biological and economic
benefits.").
200. See Leal, supra note 185, at 188 (discussing the difficulties communities face in
limiting entry into the commons).
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difficult, however. The informal nature of the arrangement limits the legal
recourse of members who feel another has infringed upon their territory. As a
result, members must resort to extra-legal means to enforce their
arrangements.20' In the case of the lobster "harbor gangs," if warnings to
observe traditional territories are not heeded, gang members will cut the buoy
lines on the lobster traps of the offending fisher.20 2 Similarly, albeit less
forcefully, shrimpers in the Gulf of Mexico sought to disadvantage newcomers
by not sharing information about the fishery with outsiders.0 3
Many community-based management systems "came about because
government officials were uninterested, leaving local fishers free to design
workable arrangements among themselves. 2 4 More formal arrangements
would be more stable and easier to enforce against outsiders. Were these
agreements formalized, however, they would almost certainly be illegal. A
written contract specifying limitations on fishing practices and territories would
constitute the sort of restraint of trade antitrust condemns. 20 5 As a result, the
property rights are less secure and dependent upon the community's ability to
maintain relative homogeneity and agreement.
D. Exempt Activities
Antitrust law is riddled with exemptions. Some of the exemptions are
judicially created, such as that for baseball.0 6 In other instances, Congress
explicitly exempted politically preferred constituencies, such as labor unions or
201. In the absence of formal state sanction, "to limit entry, a community must be able to
threaten credible force to exclude individuals not sharing its perspective." Id.
202. See Acheson, supra note 194, at 41 (noting that if a person persistently violates the
territorial boundaries "his traps wili be pulled, the buoy, toggles and warp cut off, and the trap
pushed over in deep water where he has little chance of finding it").
203. See supra note 137 and accompanying text (discussing the efforts of shrimpers to
disadvantage and discourage newcomers to the shrimping business).
204. Leal, supra note 185, at 199.
205. An agreement in restraint of trade need not be formal to be prosecuted. Formalized
agreements are, however, much easier to prosecute, as it is easier to prove that the parties to the
agreement conspired to engage in anticompetitive behavior.
206. See, e.g., Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 282 (1972) (stating that although
"[p]rofessional baseball is a business and it is engaged in interstate commerce" it is an
aberration that enjoys "exemption from federal antitrust laws"); Fed. Baseball Club of
Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of Prof. Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200, 209 (1922)
(exempting baseball from federal antitrust laws). Other sports leagues have not been so lucky.
See, e.g., Haywood v. National Basketball Ass'n, 401 U.S. 1204, 1208 (1971) ("Basketball,
however, does not enjoy exemptions from the antitrust laws."); Radovich v. National Football
League, 352 U.S. 445, 452 (1957) (subjecting football to federal antitrust laws).
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agricultural cooperatives, from the limits imposed by the Sherman Act and
other antitrust statutes. 0 7 The Fishermen's Collective Marketing Act (FCMA)
provides a limited exemption from antitrust scrutiny for certain collective
arrangements.20 8 Specifically, the FCMA authorizes "persons engaged in the
fishing industry" to "collectively catch[], produc[e], prepar[e] for market,
process[], handl[e] and market[]... such products of said persons so
engaged. 2 9 Qualifying associations must be "operated for the mutual benefit
of the members thereof' and deal primarily in the products of its members, as
opposed to nonmembers. 2'0  This exemption was modeled on a similar
exemption provided to qualified agricultural cooperatives under the Capper-
Volstead Act2 ' and is interpreted in much the same manner.212
In practice, the FCMA only exempts the specified activities. Therefore, a
collective marketing association is not exempt from all antitrust scrutiny merely
because some of its activities fall within the confines of the Act. For example,
an otherwise legal cooperative marketing association could not engage in
otherwise prohibited boycotts or concerted refusals to deal with noncooperating
dealers.2 13 Thus, insofar as the GCOSA sought to set prices and prevent
nonparticipating shrimpers and oystermen from selling their catch to
contracting packers, it was not protected by the FCMA.
Another requirement of the FCMA is that all association members be
qualifying firms under the Act.214 That is, a defendant "must establish more
than just the fact that he is qualified to act collectively under the Act, but he
must also establish that all those with whom he is allegedly associated are
likewise entitled to the Act's protection.""' Thus, when Samuel Hinote, CEO
of Delta Pride Catfish, Inc., was indicted for conspiring to fix prices in
violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, his motion to dismiss the indictment
207. For a list of exemptions, see WILLIAM F. SHUGART, THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY
333-34 (1997).
208. 15 U.S.C. § 521 (2000).
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. 7 U.S.C. § 291 (2000).
212. See, e.g., United States v. Hinote, 823 F. Supp. 1350, 1353 n.4 (S.D. Miss. 1993)
("[The two Acts provide exemptions from antitrust liability for essentially the same
activities.").
213. See Local 36 ofInt'l Fishermen & Allied Workers of Am. v. United States, 177 F.2d
320, 334 (9th Cir. 1949) (explaining that although an association under the FCMA is permitted
to fix prices on behalf of itself or its members, it cannot attempt to do so using tactics which are
not free and voluntary or by using any other illegal means).
214. 15 U.S.C. § 521 (2000).
215. Hinote, 823 F. Supp. at 1353 n.5.
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was denied for failure to meet this FCMA requirement.2 16 Delta Pride, a catfish
processor, was a qualified fishing firm because all of its shareholders were
catfish farmers." 7 Therefore, Delta Pride could process its members' harvest
and market their product at a set price without violating antitrust constraints. "'
The government prosecuted Hinote because Delta Pride associated with
other firms not entitled to the FCMA's protection.21 9 Specifically, Delta Pride
agreed to fix catfish prices with several other catfish processors, including
two-Country Skillet Catfish Company and Farm Fresh Catfish Company-
which were more fully integrated firms.2 Merely because Country Skillet and
Farm Fresh owned or leased catfish ponds did not qualify them for the FCMA
exemption. 22' Rather, as integrated firms that independently marketed and
distributed their own product, Country Skillet and Farm Fresh were not the sort
of small, independent producers that the FCMA was intended to benefit.222 As
interpreted by federal courts, the FCMA exemption appears to be limited to
horizontal arrangements among small producers. 23 Vertical associations or
collective efforts with vertically integrated firms are likely to forfeit protection
from FCMA prosecution, even though such arrangements could have a pro-
competitive effect.
224
Any cooperative agreement is inherently unstable and prone to cheating,
which is why cartels typically fail. As output is restricted and prices rise, cartel
members face increasing incentives to increase output in violation of the cartel
agreement. 225  This pressure, over time, tends to break up the cartel
arrangement. The same is true for more benign collective agreements that
likewise seek to prevent free-riding by members. For such agreements to
survive, there must be an enforcement mechanism so that each participant can
216. Id. at 1360.
217. Id. at 1354 n.8.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 1352.
220. See id. at 1353 n.5 (stating that the defendant's co-conspirators, Country Skillet and
Farm Fresh, were not qualified to act collectively).
221. Id. at 1359.
222. See id. (stating that extending the FCMA exemption to fully integrated producers
would defeat the Act's purpose of protecting independent producers).
223. See id. at 1354 (noting that the exemption has not been permitted when members of an
association are middlemen or processors).
224. See id. (explaining that prior Supreme Court cases established that cooperatives
between farmers and middlemen are not protected by the Act and ultimately concluding that
cooperatives between farmers and fully integrated firms are similarly not protected).
225. See I HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS 420-21 (Richard Schmalensee &
Richard D. Willig eds., 1989) (explaining the incentives to cheat that arise in cartels).
CONSER VA TION THROUGH COLLUSION
know with reasonable certainty that abiding by the terms of the agreement will
not place him at a competitive disadvantage.226 An agreement with a processor
to set a given price or establish a quota can provide just this function by
eliminating (or at least reducing) the incentive that a member of the agreement
would have to cheat. Specifically, associations among fish producers and
processors may facilitate conservation agreements that would otherwise be
unenforceable. Therefore, the exclusion of such arrangements from protection
under the FCMA limits the environmental benefit of the exemption.
E. Harvesting Cooperatives
Despite the prosecution of fishers' unions in the 1930s and 1940s, there
have been recent organizational efforts by fishing firms to create voluntary
cooperatives that, among other things, collectively market products or allocate
catch shares among members. Such efforts have evolved largely due to the
desire among some fishers to rationalize the management of fisheries plagued
by overcapitalization, waste, and inefficiency because of economic and
regulatory pressures to maximize catches. In the absence of property-oriented
changes in fishery regulatory regimes, such as a move toward Individual
Transferable Quotas (ITQs), some fishing communities are inclined to
reconsider cooperative efforts that can create informal property rights.
22 7
At first it might seem that cooperative efforts to create informal property
rights in shares of a seasonal fishery harvest-essentially informal ITQs-
would run afoul of antitrust prohibitions. As Sullivan notes, "Collective
harvesting arrangements among fishermen have commonly been considered to
fall within the 'market allocation' class of per se violations that are illegal"
under federal antitrust law.228 In fisheries where catch limits and license
requirements have already been imposed by regulatory authorities, however, the
federal government has been more receptive to cooperative arrangements, such
as harvesting cooperatives, that allocate catch shares among licensed fishers.
226. See id. at 425 (explaining that procedures deterring defection must be created so that
members do not free ride and unfairly increase their profits).
227. See Joseph Sullivan, Harvesting Cooperatives and U.S. Antitrust Law: Recent
Developments and Implications, paper presented at IIFET 2000 (2000), at I ("Given the
uncertain future of[IFQ systems], fishermen seeking rationalization will logically turn to private
agreements allocating harvesting privileges."), available at http://oregonstate.edu/dept/I!
FET/2000/speakers.html.
228. Id. at 2.
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Under the Magnuson Act," 9 the federal government imposed strict catch
limits on the U.S. Pacific Coast whiting fishery.230 Fishing licenses were
limited but transferable.23" ' The total allowable catch (TAG) was divided among
several classes of fishing firms: on-shore processing plants, "mothership"
processors, and catcher/processors.232 Within each class the fishery adopted an
"Olympic" system, whereby any licensed fishing firm was entitled to catch as
much of the harvest allocated to its class as it was able. In practice, this
encouraged the "race to fish," as each fishing firm sought to harvest as many
fish as it could within a short period of time so as to capture the greatest
possible share of the harvest allocated to its class.233 While the total catch limit
helped to conserve the fishery, the competitive pressure of the Olympic system
fostered overcapitalization, inefficiency, and waste, including substantial
bycatch.
By 1996, there were only four catcher/processors left in the Pacific Coast
whiting fishery.234 These firms recognized that they could harvest the total
allowable catch for their class in a far more efficient and cost-effective manner
if they allocated portions of the TAC amongst themselves, thereby eliminating
the "race to fish. 235 Under the existing rules, the pressure to catch fish quickly
was so great that the entire quota would be harvested in just fourteen days.236
Were the race to be limited, however, the firms recognized that they could cut
costs and increase product recovery by as much as 25%.237
229. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-82 (2000).
230. See Sullivan, supra note 227, at 4 ("The Pacific whiting fishery... is managed under
a strict annual sectoral harvest limit.").
231. See id. at 4-5 (discussing the limits on licenses and the leasing of operators' shares by
more efficient operators).
232. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Justice Department Approves Fish
Catchers/Processors Proposal to Allocate Amongst Themselves the Amount of Government-
Regulated Pacific Whiting They Can Harvest (May 20, 1997), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press.releases/1997/index97.htm. A "mothership" processor is
a ship that has on-board processing capability but does not itself catch fish. A catcher/processor
is a ship that catches and processes its own fish on-board. Id.
233. For discussion of the "race to fish," see supra notes 71-78 and accompanying text.
234. See Sullivan, supra note 227, at 4 ("By late 1996, a fairly restrictive limited entry
license program... effectively limited the catcher/processor fleet to ten vessels owned by four
companies.").
235. See id. ("[T]he four companies had reached a common understanding that nationalized
operations could increase product recovery by as much as 25%, while cutting costs of
operations.").
236. See Bruce Ramsey, Companies Agree to End "Race for Fish," SEATTLE POST-
INTELLIGENCER, May 31, 1997, at B8 (discussing the "14-day 'race for fish"').
237. Sullivan, supra note 227, at 4 (describing the industry understanding that a
rationalized operation would increase productivity and cut costs).
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In 1997, the catcher/processors in the Pacific Coast whiting fishery created
the Pacific Whiting Conservation Cooperative (PWCC).238  The primary
purpose of the cooperative was to allocate portions of the catch among its
members, creating informal property rights in the harvest similar to ITQs.
239
Because there were so few firms involved, each sharing a common interest, the
coordination costs were low enough to reach a quick agreement on how to
divide the catch. 240 They further agreed to make their allocations transferable
among each other.24' The Antitrust Division of the Justice Department
consented to the formation of the cooperative because the four firms agreed to
continue processing, marketing, and selling their products on a competitive
basis, and because the agreement would not further reduce fishery output.
242
Joel Klein, then-acting Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, observed that
the harvest allocation was "unlikely to reduce output or increase price under
any scenario. 2 43 If anything, the cooperative would reduce prices and increase
the volume of fish available to consumers from the same harvest level by
increasing efficiency.
The PWCC yielded impressive results, economically and ecologically. As
under ITQ programs, fishing efficiency increased as "more efficient operators
leased shares from less efficient ones" and firms reduced the number of fishing
vessels in the fishery.244 The recovery rate-the amount of saleable product
recovered from fish-increased substantially. 24  Indeed, the four firms
produced over five million pounds more food from the same volume of fish
caught-often of higher quality-while using fewer boats.246 The incidental
catching of non-target fish species-so-called "bycatch"-was cut dramatically
238. Id. at 5.
239. See id. (explaining that the membership agreement of the cooperative embodied the
harvesting share allocation agreement reached by the parties).
240. See id. ("[T]he companies were able to negotiate harvest shares quickly and
efficiently... in a session that lasted less than halfa day.").
241. Id.
242. See id. (noting that the antitrust division indicated that an agreement improving
efficiency and productivity and providing for competitive marketing of products would receive a
favorable review and later stating that the cooperative's agreement received favorable review).
243. Ramsey, supra note 236 (quoting Joel Klein, then acting United States Assistant
Attorney General).
244. Sullivan, supra note 227, at 5.
245. Id. at 6.
246. See Justin Leblanc, United States' Fishery Cooperatives: Rationalizing Fisheries
through Privately Negotiated Contracts, in USE OF PROPERTY RIGHTS IN FISHERIES
MANAGEMENT, 404/2FAO FISHERIES TECHNICAL PAPER 215, 216 (Ross Shotton ed., 2000)
(noting that the PWCC "resulted in the production of an additional 5,269,435 pounds of food
from the same amount of fish").
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as well.247 Enforcement of seasonal catch allocations also improved, as the
cooperative contracted with a fishery harvest monitoring service to enforce the
arrangement and prevent cheating.248
The PWCC was so successful that it spawned another private harvesting
agreement in the North Pacific pollock fishery. Notably, the four firms
involved in organizing the PWCC were instrumental in helping
catcher/processors in the pollock fishery to form the Pollock Conservation
Cooperative (PCC).24 9  Passage of the American Fisheries Ace5 further
facilitated creation of the PCC, as it subdivided the pollock fishery into sectors
as already had been done with the whiting fishery. The allocation of harvest
shares through the PCC eliminated the "race to fish," enabling a longer (and
more ecologically sound) fishing season, increasing harvest efficiency, reducing
overcapitalization, and facilitating other conservation efforts.25 2 Specifically,
the operating season approximately doubled in length, and cooperative
members increased the recovery of saleable product by 20%."' As with the
PWCC, the Justice Department declined to prosecute, citing the potential pro-
competitive impacts of the cooperative.25 4
247. See Leblanc, supra note 246, at 216 ("The PWCC has demonstrated that a cooperative
approach to fishery operation can ... decrease bycatch."); Sullivan, supra note 227, at 5 (noting
that "the bycatch for yellowtail rockfish ... fell from 2.47 kilograms... to .99 kilograms of
rockfish per metric ton of whiting").
248. See Sullivan, supra note 227, at 5 (noting that the members hired a private fisheries
monitoring service to track members' catch amounts).
249. See id. at 6 (stating that the apparent success of the PWCC caused the four PWCC
companies to attempt a-comparable agreement in the Pollock fishery).
250. American Fisheries Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 (1998).
251. See Scott C. Matulich et al., Fishery Cooperatives as an Alternative to ITQs:
Implications ofthe American Fisheries Act, 16 MARINE REs. ECON. 1, 3(2001) (stating that "the
AFA implemented cooperatives differentially among sectors"); Sullivan, supra note 227, at 7
(explaining that the American Fisheries Act divided the Bering Sea Pollock fishery into three
sectors).
252. See generally AT-SEA PROCESSORS ASSOCIATION, PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF THE
POLLOCK CONSERVATION COOPERATIVE (1999) (discussing the PCC and its various benefits).
253. Criddle & Macinko, supra note 87, at 463-64 (stating that under the PCC the
operating season increased from seventy-five days to 149 days and product recovery per fish
increased by 20%).
254. Press Release, Department of Justice, Justice Department Approves Proposal by the
Pollock Conservative Cooperative (Feb. 29, 2000), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/
2000/February/086at.htm. In 2002, a fishing cooperative was adopted for Alaska's Chignik
salmon fishery as well. See Wesley Loy, Co-op Revolutionizes Chignik Fishery, ANCHORAGE
DAILY NEWS, June 22, 2002, at D I ("[M]ost of the approximately 100 boat owners at Chignik
have joined a cooperative to catch their fish.").
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The imposition of total catch limits was a precondition to the successful
creation of both the whiting and pollock harvesting cooperatives. Once fishery
output was limited by regulation, antitrust enforcers had little reason to fear that
cooperative arrangements to allocate portions of the market would reduce
consumer welfare by further reducing output and increasing prices. Indeed, by
eliminating the "race to fish" and increasing fishing efficiency, the market
allocation agreements had the opposite effect. The cooperatives also produced
ecological benefits, most notably the reduction in bycatch and greater seasonal
balance in fishing patterns. Their conservation value is limited, however,
because the cooperatives may not agree to reduce the total catch below the level
already set by the government. Thus, insofar as total catch limits in these
fisheries is not set at a sustainable level, there is little the cooperatives can do to
address the problem. Nonetheless, the cooperatives illustrate the substantial
economic and ecological benefits that can arise from private ordering in marine
fisheries that operates to create individual property rights to fish harvests
through contract.
F. Antitrust and ITQs
One relatively successful government intervention to address the tragedy
of the marine commons has been the creation of "individual transferable
quotas," or "ITQs," in marine fisheries.2" One aim of 1TQ systems is to
conserve commons by setting a total allowable catch and then encouraging
greater efficiency within the fishery by apportioning transferable percentage
shares--quota-to participating fishers. As such, ITQs prevent the tragedy of
the commons by restricting harvests to a sustainable level. There is some irony
here, as Professor Yandle notes, because one could view the formation of 1TQs
as the creation of a "collusive ring under the protection of statute law." 256 As
discussed above, were a private association to try and impose a total allowable
catch on a local fishery, it would violate federal antitrust laws, even if it did not
then seek to apportion shares to association members in the form of ITQs.
2 7
The nature of the antitrust concern in the ITQ context is slightly different
than that discussed above. Once an ITQ system is implemented, it is generally
expected that, barring substantial transaction costs, more efficient fishers will
255. See supra notes 81-90 and accompanying text (discussing the development of ITQs).
256. Yandle, supra note 121, at 46.
257. See supra Parts !V.A & B (describing agreements within the fishery context that were
held to be in violation of the Sherman Act).
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purchase quota from less efficient fishers.2"8 This sale could well produce some
consolidation within the fishery to the detriment of smaller fishing firms. An
antitrust concern arises because of the potential for a small number of large, but
efficient, fishers to achieve market power through consolidation and the
acquisition of quota from other fishers. While ITQs are generally regarded as a
positive step toward more sustainable fishery management, some environmental
groups oppose the creation of ITQs due to concerns about consolidation and the
potential for corporate control of large portions of fisheries in which ITQs are
adopted.25 9
Milliken suggests an individual or group could obtain market power by
acquiring a substantial portion of available ITQs and then utilize the market
power to extract monopoly rents.2 °  This acquisition could occur
"horizontally," if the quotas are acquired by one or more fishers, or "vertically,"
if the quotas are obtained by processors or wholesalers. As noted above,
collusion between boat owners and fishers, on the one hand, and processors and
wholesalers on the other, has raised antitrust concerns. 26' To address this
concern, Milliken suggests that all ITQ plans "include a maximum ownership
provision" limiting the quota percentage that a single entity may own or
control.
2 6
Federal law seeks to mitigate concerns about market power by limiting the
ability of a single entity to acquire a disproportionate share of quota in a given
market. The Magnuson Act explicitly requires that each Fishery Management
Plan is "carried out in such a manner that no particular individual, corporation,
or other entity acquires an excessive share of such privileges. 263 Federal
regulations further provide that any allocation scheme deter any entity from
acquiring an excessive share of fishing rights or market power over the
258. See supra note 231 and accompanying text (discussing the PWCC and the practice of
leasing shares from less efficient operators to increase efficiency).
259. See, e.g., FRIENDS OF THE EARTH, PROTECT OUR FISHERIES, at http://www.foe.
org/camps/eco/ifq (last visited Feb. 7, 2004) (arguing that ITQ systems could cause fishery
consolidation by "large fishing corporations") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review); see also supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text (describing these concerns).
260. See William J. Milliken, Individual Transferable Fishing Quotas and Antitrust Law,
I OCEAN AND COASTAL L. J. 35,44 (1994) ("[O]ne antitrust concern in ocean fisheries is that an
individual or a group of individuals could monopolize the market, that is, obtain an excessive
share of licenses or percentage of the quota, and subsequently use that position to exact unfair
economic advantage over consumers.").
261. See supra Parts IV.A & B (describing agreements within the fishery context that were
held to be in violation of the Sherman Act).
262. Milliken, supra note 260, at 50 (1994). Sullivan raises a similar concern and also
suggests consideration of share aggregation limits. Sullivan, supra note 227, at 9.
263. 16 U.S.C. § 185 1(a)(4)(C) (2000).
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fishery. 264 This concern must be explicitly addressed in the implementation of
ITQ proposals.
When the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) approved the
creation of ITQs in the Atlantic surf clam and ocean quahog fishery, it
explicitly addressed concerns that the ITQ regime would produce "a massive
consolidation of vessels" in the fishery.2 65 While NMFS acknowledged that
such "massive consolidation" was possible, it concluded that the allocation
distribution system and expected high quota prices would make such
consolidation unlikely, and that some consolidation would be acceptable if it
increased efficiency.266 Further, NMFS noted that it would review future
allocation transfers and "advise the Council and the U.S. Department of Justice
when it appears an excessive number of shares are held by one person.
2 67
Two groups of fishers and seafood processors challenged the plan to
implement 1TQs in the Atlantic surf clam and ocean quahog fishery in federal
district court.26' These plaintiffs alleged, among other things, that the plan
would result in excessive consolidation as smaller, less efficient fishers sold
their quota shares to their larger competitors. 269 These plaintiffs alleged that
two fishers already held approximately 40% of the annual quota for ocean
quahogs, and that further consolidation was likely.270 While the court declared
that the 40% figure did "give pause," it rejected the complaint because NMFS
explicitly considered these concerns in developing the ITQ plan and left open
the possibility of a referral to the Department of Justice should a fisher seek to
monopolize the fishery.27' Other fisheries utilizing transferable quota schemes
have also addressed concerns about consolidation.272
264. 50 C.F.R. 602.14 (2000).
265. Atlantic Surf Clam and Ocean Quahog Fishery, 55 Fed. Reg. 24,184,24,186 (June 14,
1990) (codified at 50 C.F.R. 652).
266. See id. ("The... allocation distribution system and the high price expected for
allocation shares will not be conducive to individuals acquiring excessive shares of the resource
to any greater extent than the current circumstances of the fishery permit.").
267. Id.
268. Sea Watch Int'l v. Mosbacher, 762 F. Supp. 370 (D.D.C. 1991).
269. See id. at 380 ("Plaintiffs argue that [the plan] creates incentives for consolidation of
the quahog fishery.").
270. Id.
271. Id. As a result of this decision, Mannina suggests that it is unlikely that any ITQ plan
approved by NMFS could be challenged on the grounds that it allows an entity to acquire an
"excessive share" of quotas in a fishery in violation of the Magnuson Act. George J. Mannina,
Jr., Is There a Legal and Conservation Basis for Individual Fishing Quotas?, 3 OCEAN AND
COASTAL L.J. 5, 27 (1997).
272. Another example is the fishery management plan governing the Pacific Coast sablefish
fishery, which limits the maximum number of fishing permits a single individual or corporation
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The United States government is not alone in seeking to limit the potential
concentration of quota under an ITQ regime. In Iceland, there are species-
specific ceilings on the portion of ITQs that a single fishing firm may own.273
Concerns about concentration may be exaggerated. Professor Repetto reports
that Canada's sea scallop fishery has seen only modest consolidation.274 One
fish processor purchased quota for approximately 31% of the catch, but the
majority of the quota remains in the hands of those to whom it was allocated in
1986, providing "little evidence.., that a rights-based regime results in
monopolization of the fishery."275  Professor Gissurarson reports similar
findings from Iceland, where the largest firm still held quota for less than 6% of
the total catch as of the 1998-99 season.276
Insofar as antitrust concerns lead to limitations on the transferability of
quota under ITQ regimes, this will reduce the potential efficiency gains of the
ITQ regime from fleet consolidation.277 On the other hand, fishers with ITQs
no longer need to race to catch the most fish in a short period of time. This
both increases safety for fishers, and it reduces crowding and potentially
harmful fishing practices. "Fishermen with lower harvesting costs, in turn,
have more money to invest in resource improvement., 278 Their right to a
portion of the catch internalizes the returns of fishery-wide conservation
decisions.279 Since the implementation of ITQs in New Zealand, quota holders
have begun to invest voluntarily in independent fishery research and monitoring
efforts. 2 0 Among other things, this research has helped reduce bycatch and
may own. See Fisheries off West Coast States and in the Western Pacific Coast Groundfish
Fishery, Amendment 14, 66 Fed. Reg. 41,152, 41,153 (200 1) (explaining that this amendment
"allows some consolidation, but not unlimited consolidation, because it could cause excessive
concentration of control.").
273. See GISSURARSON, supra note 85, at 23 ("[N]o fishing firm may control more than
10% of the ITQs in cod and haddock and more than 20% of the ITQs in saithe, redfish,
Greenland halibut, herring, deep sea shrimp and capelin.").
274. See REPErrO, supra note 86, at 16 (noting that Canada's sea scallop fishery has seen
some consolidation but indicating that it has not been significant).
275. Id.
276. See GISSURARSON, supra note 85, at 53 ("The two largest firms... each held 5.5% of
the total demersal quotas in 1998/9.").
277. See id. at 40 (noting that the system would be more efficient if ITQs were freely
transferable and issued to individuals and firms rather than vessels).
278. Rieser, supra note 54, at 823.
279. See REPETTo, supra note 86, at 9 ("Internationalizing the returns to conservation
decisions is one of the characteristics of rights-based fishing regimes.").
280. See Michael Harte, Opportunities and Barriersfor Industry-Led Fisheries Research,
25 MARINE POL'Y 159, 160-61 (2001) (explaining that in response to the quota management
system, New Zealand quota owners have organized management associations that, among other
things, collect money to finance research); Rieser, supra note 54, at 823-24 (stating that IFQ
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harm to nontarget species populations, including seabirds and marine
mammals."' ITQs have encouraged greater private investment in fishery
research in Canada's scallop fishery as well.282 These gains are due, in part, to
the efficiency improvements brought about by ITQs. Limitations on the
transfer of ITQs to the most efficient fishers, whether motivated by concerns
over consolidation or a desire to preserve local fishing communities, can reduce
efficiency gains on the margin as well as the consequent environmental
benefits. 283 Thus, even when not prohibiting the formation of conservation
cartels, antitrust law has the potential to frustrate conservation in the marine
commons.
V. Conservation Through Collusion in Other Contexts
Fisheries are not the only context in which antitrust principles may conflict
with conservation goals. In principle, the conflict between conservation and
competition policy can occur with any open-access common pool resource.
Antitrust concerns are present wherever private cooperative action operates to
conserve the underlying resource by reducing collective utilization rates. This
point is not merely theoretical. Antitrust principles and conservation concerns
have also come into conflict in the context of underground oil deposits,
precipitating state interventions to facilitate more efficient resource
utilization.284 It is also possible that antitrust could inhibit cooperative efforts
holders in New Zealand "are beginning to engage in beneficial management behaviors such as
monitoring catches, studying stock abundance, and funding exploratory fishing operations to
develop new fisheries").
281. Harte, supra note 280, at 160 ("Significant research effort has reduced non-target
bycatch and seabird and marine mammal bycatch.").
282. See REPETrO, supra note 86, at 14 (noting that the Canadian industry has financed a
costly research program).
283. Indeed, some commentators attribute at least some of the efficiency and effectiveness
of fishing cooperatives, such as the PWCC and PCC, to the fact that they "are unencumbered by
the restrictions on share concentration, absentee ownership, leasing, and transfer" that are
typically imposed on ITQ regimes. Criddle & Macinko, supra note 87, at 465.
284. As used here, "conservation" is defined in its traditional sense as the effort to
maximize the productive use of natural resources. See SAMUEL P. HAYS, CONSERVATION AND
THE GOSPEL EFFICIENCY: THE PROGRESSIVE CONSERVATION MOVEMENT 1890-1920, at 1-2
(1959) (describing the essence of environmental conservation as "rational planning to promote
efficient development and use of all natural resources"). In the context of oil deposits,
conservation goals are served by policies that maximize the production of oil from a given
deposit. The pursuit of conservation may conflict with other environmental goals, however,
insofar as the production and combustion of oil is associated with other environmental
problems.
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to control pollution. While the claim in the pollution context is certainly more
speculative, it nonetheless highlights the conceptual tension between the
demands of conservation and the proscriptions of antitrust law.
A. Oil Fields
Much like fisheries, underground oil reservoirs, if unowned, have the
properties of an open-access commons. 285 Although property rights to the
surface typically include reserved rights to minerals below, oil reservoirs
typically stretch across numerous surface properties. Under the rule of capture,
landowners acquire property rights to oil upon extraction. This rule gives each
surface owner an incentive to maximize his or her production at the expense of
the whole.286 This incentive is heightened due to the migratory nature of oil
deposits. Extracting oil from one point in the reservoir reduces the
underground pressure in that part of the deposit, drawing oil from elsewhere
within the reservoir.2 7 Therefore, by drilling first and extracting oil more
rapidly than other users, a firm can capture a greater share of the deposit.
2 88
Insofar as all users face the same incentive, all are encouraged "drill and
drain. 28 9 Such activities have their costs, however. Rapid extraction from an
oil deposit reduces the volume of recoverable oil from an underground
petroleum reservoir. 290 Left to their own devices, multiple firms with rights to
285. See Gary D. Libecap, Contracting for Property Rights, in PROPERTY RiGHTS:
COOPERATION, CONFLICT, AND LAW 142, 157 (Terry L. Anderson & Fred S. McChesney eds.,
2003) (stating that "[i]n effect, the reservoir is a fishery" because of its common pool nature).
286. See Gary D. Libecap & Steven N. Wiggins, The Influence of Private Contractual
Failure on Regulation: The Case of Oil Field Unitization, 93 J. POL. ECON. 690,693 (1985)
[hereinafter Libecap & Wiggins, Oil Field Unitization] (explaining that the rule of capture,
when applied in the context of crude oil production, results in competitive behavior among
firms that leads to "excessive wells" and "rapid extraction rates"); see also I ROBERT L.
BRADLEY, JR., OIL, GAS AND GOVERNMENT: THE U.S. EXPERIENCE 115 (1996) (noting that the
"rule of capture" when applied to underground oil and gas deposits "was destructive to
producers since it bred resource inefficiency and encouraged overdrilling, overproduction, and
price instability").
287. See Gary D. Libecap & Steven N. Wiggins, Contractual Responses to the Common
Pool: Prorationing of Crude Oil Production, 74 AM. ECON. REv. 87, 88 (1984) [hereinafter
Libecap & Wiggins, Contractual Responses] (explaining the processes followed when an oil
producer captures oil from a reservoir).
288. See id. ("As a firm drills additional wells, oil migrates more rapidly into the created
low pressure zone, raising the firm's share of field output.").
289. See id. (describing the benefits of being the first producer to extract from a reservoir);
see also Libecap & Wiggins, Oil Field Unitization, supra note 286, at 693 (noting the higher
marginal costs associated with extracting leftover oil).
290. 1 BRADLEY, supra note 286, at 115. This reduction is caused by a reduction in
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extract oil from a single underground reservoir will prematurely exhaust the
resource. "Drill and drain" is the oil deposit analog to the "race to fish." Just as
in the fishery context, allowing the oil pool to remain an open-access commons
leads to "ruin."2 91
As with other common pool resources, the problem of premature resource
exhaustion can be mitigated by sole ownership. A single owner has substantial
incentive to maximize the value of the owned resource. In the case of oil,
slower and more controlled extraction can reduce the amount of contamination
or loss of the deposit and maximize the amount of recoverable oil.2 92 Yet, as
already noted, there is rarely a single owner of a given reservoir. Firms are left
with the choice of developing cooperative resource development strategies or
relying upon government regulation to ensure more efficient resource use.293
As the oil industry developed, so did the understanding of reservoir
mechanics. Oil developers learned the benefit of more deliberate and
coordinated development of underground deposits.294 As the knowledge base
improved, the industry began to adopt more efficient development strategies,
including contractual arrangements for oil field management. 295  Where
multiple firms held development rights in a single oil field, they would
sometimes seek to negotiate a means to coordinate their development so as to
subsurface pressure and the consequent "trapping" of oil pockets within the reservoir. See
Libecap & Wiggins, Oil Field Unitization, supra note 286, at 693-94 (describing problems
associated with retrieving oil after a loss of pressure); Libecap & Wiggins, Contractual
Responses, supra note 287, at 88 (explaining the natural effects of rapid oil extraction).
291. Hardin, supra note 30, at 1247.
292. See I BRADLEY, supra note 286, at I 10 (explaining that overdrilling leads to capital
waste and a loss of retrievable oil).
293. According to some accounts, the eventual push for unitization was driven by the
desire to replicate the benefits of sole ownership of underground oil and gas deposits:
The idea of unit operation or overall control of a pool was not... wholly new or
offensive, for it had been the ambition of every oil man since the beginning of the
industry to own an entire pool, so that he could drill and produce according to his
own ideas of efficiency and good economics, not being bedeviled by neighbors who
could, in the usual competitive situation, set a pace that he had to follow or else
suffer the drainage of oil and gas under his lands to the wells of his neighbors, with
no right to prevent the competitive operations or to recover damages caused by the
drainage.
ROBERT HARDWICKE ET AL., ANTITRUST LAWS V. UNIT OPERATION OF OILORGAS POOLS 12 (rev.
ed. 1961).
294. See I BRADLEY, supra note 286, at Ill (noting that the industry's "self-interest"
required a "radical[]" change in "production philosophies," "substituting a common plan of
reservoir development for autonomous capture-rule competition").
295. The various types of strategies employed, and their relative costs and benefits, are
described in Libecap & Wiggins, Contractual Responses, supra note 287, at 87.
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reduce the exploitation rate and maximize the aggregate value of the field.296
From the beginning, however, there was concern that cooperative efforts among
oil companies to maximize production from oil deposits could raise antitrust
concerns. 7 "Short of concentrated ownership, what was needed to mitigate
overdrilling and overproduction was reservoir operation as ifreservoirs were
singularly owned," observed Robert L. Bradley, Jr., in his encyclopedic Oil,
Gas & Governmentl.298 As with fisheries, in the absence of a sole owner or
effective government intervention, the tragedy of the commons could be
avoided if the various resource users would cooperate in limiting and
controlling their exploitation of the underlying resource. And, as with fisheries,
such private efforts were discouraged by the specter of antitrust prosecution. 99
As Professor Gibbs noted in 1927, "There will be overcompetition and
overproduction until nature's supply is prematurely exhausted unless there is
relaxation of the Sherman law's mandate forcing unlimited competition
applying to oil production." 3 °
In the case of oil field development, both state and federal antitrust laws
were to blame. By 1891, eighteen states had already adopted antitrust laws.30
Among these were oil-rich states such as Texas, Kansas, and Oklahoma.0 2
"The Texas antitrust laws originating in 1889 were antithetical to the very
concept of unitization."30 3 Prohibited activities included arrangements to
combine capital or skill to limit or control the output of any product. 304 An
agreement to limit production was a felony.305 Although relatively few cases
were filed in Texas, the legal regime nonetheless served to discourage oil
developers from adopting some voluntary unitization and cooperative
296. In addition to increasing the volume of oil that could be extracted, such coordination
also allowed for more profitable development rates and reduced capital costs. See Libecap &
Wiggins, Oil Field Unitization, supra note 286, at 693 (discussing the efficiency, economic, and
financial gains that accompanied fieldwide unitization).
297. See I BRADLEY, supra note 286, at 112 (noting that the American Bar Association's
Committee on Conservation of Mineral Resources' concern with such agreements conflicts with
antitrust law); see generally HARDWICKE ET AL., supra note 293.
298. 1 BRADLEY, supra note 286, at 121.
299. See id. (noting that both federal and state antitrust legislation chilled coordinated
drilling projects).
300. Vernon Gibbs, Oil Industry Must Have Moratorium, OIL & GAS JOURNAL, Dec. I,
1927, at 143,210.
301. I BRADLEY, supra note 286, at 121.
302. Id.
303. JACQUELINE LANG WEAVER, UNITIZATION OF OIL AND GAS FIELDS IN TEXAs 303 (1986).
304. See id. at 79 (describing unlawful cooperative agreements by producers).
305. See I BRADLEY, supra note 286, at 122 (explaining the penalties for violating the
Sherman Act).
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development.3 °6 Other states responded to similar concerns by exempting
unitization-which served to enhance the total volume of recoverable oil-or
by adopting compulsory unitization rules.3°7
In 1949, the Texas legislature adopted a voluntary unitization law that
provided limited antitrust relief to certain types of cooperative arrangements.0 8
Yet, by offering only limited immunity to certain types of arrangements, the law
had the unintended consequence of "increas[ing] the antitrust risks of entering
into other types of voluntary agreements.30 09 Despite the reforms, voluntary
unitization remained a potential antitrust violation under Texas law until 1983,
and even then prosecution was possible of agreements not approved by the
Texas Railroad Commission3. 0 Compulsory unitization laws were also an
imperfect solution to the conflict between antitrust laws and efficient resource
use. For instance, such laws restricted the ability of oil developers to tailor
production arrangements to particular circumstances.3 ' Unitization in
accordance with compulsory regulations was often inferior to the voluntary
arrangements it would displace.
Federal antitrust law was no less relevant. Adoption of the Sherman Act
in 1890 "cast a legal shadow on cooperative action designed to curtail current
oil production. 31 2 The Justice Department's decision to file suit against a set
of oil field operators in Louisiana in 1947 lengthened the shadow considerably,
even if the case focused on joint processing and refining activities and was
306. See WEAVER, supra note 303, at 303 ("Very few cases exist on this issue despite the
great ferment on the subject in the 1930s and 1940s, when the emerging concept of unitization
was alternately praised as a foremost conservation device and condemned as a monopolistic
scheme of the major oil companies.").
307. See id. (explaining that many state exemption unitization agreements exempting oil
producers from antitrust penalties are created because of the "public interest of increasing the
ultimate recovery of oil and gas"); Gary D. Libecap & James L. Smith, The Economic Evolution
of Petroleum Property Rights in the United States, 31 J. LEGAL. STuD. 5,589, 5,596 (2002)
(noting that roughly half of the states adopted unitization assistance laws).
308. See WEAVER, supra note 303, at 97 (describing ancillary effects of the legislation on
oil producers).
309. Id.
310. See I BRADLEY, supra note 286, at 125 (explaining that voluntary unitization
agreements may still be prosecuted under Texas law despite the 1983 revisions); WEAVER, supra
note 303, at 131, 303-04 (noting that unitization agreements prior to 1983 were essentially per
se violations of state antitrust laws and that post- 1983 agreements must still be approved by the
Texas Railroad Commission in order to enjoy antitrust immunity).
311. See generally Gary D. Libecap & James L. Smith, Regulatory Remedies to the
Common Pool: The Limits to Oil Field Unitization, 22 Energy J. 1 (2001) (discussing the
inefficiencies that accompany compulsory unitization laws while demonstrating that any attempt
to unitize oil fields may lead to undesirable outcomes).
312. 1 BRADLEY, supra note 286, at 122.
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eventually dismissed." 3 Oil developers' concerns were heightened still further
one year later when Yale law professor Eugene V. Rostow argued that a federal
compulsory unitization law was necessary because, among other reasons, state
alternatives facilitated price-fixing. 14 In a case decided much later-perhaps
the only case in which unitization efforts were successfully prosecuted for
antitrust violations-the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
made explicit that state regulation of oil and gas development would not
exempt regulated activities from antitrust liability under federal law.315
Some analysts have suggested that oil developer fears of antitrust
prosecution were overblown.316 There were few actual prosecutions, and
substantial reasons to believe that, at least in some cases, cooperative efforts to
limit the rate of extraction could be defended successfully. Even assuming that
such assessments were accurate, antitrust laws nonetheless discouraged
welfare-enhancing arrangements for oil pools. That there was some uncertainty
as to whether cooperative efforts would be prosecuted did not eliminate the
313. See United States v. Cotton Valley Operators Comm., 77 F. Supp. 409,409 (W.D. La.
1948) (prosecuting an oil field unitization and pressure maintenance agreement under the
Sherman Anti-Trust Act); see also HARDW1CKE ET AL., supra note 293, at 134-37,211-28,329-
30 (providing a detailed account of the circumstances surrounding the Cotton Valley case);
WEAVER, supra note 303, at 79, 304-05 (discussing a heightened concern for antitrust liability
for those producers with cooperative agreements as a result of Cotton Valley).
314. See WEAVER, supra note 303, at 79 (noting that Rostow's publication caused states to
alter their respective laws in order to "encourage unitization and avoid federal intervention");
EUGENE V. RosTow, A NATIONAL POLICY FOR THE OIL INDUSTRY 34-42 (1948) (describing ways
in which parties behaved in the absence of unitization as conflicting with conservation
objectives).
315. See Woods Exploration & Producing Co. v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 438 F.2d 1286,
1295 (5th Cir. 1971) (refusing to permit state-prescribed procedures to circumvent the policy
objectives of the Sherman Act), overruled on other grounds by Affiliated Capital Corp. v. City
of Houston, 793 F.2d 706 (5th Cir. 1986). Some twenty-five years earlier, however, the federal
government had entered into a consent decree with several oil companies to settle several
antitrust claims that barred agreements among competitors to limit crude production for the
purpose of controlling oil prices, but exempted agreements designed to ensure the maximum
efficient extraction of oil from underground pools. See Charles B. Renfrew, Intercompetitor
Cooperation in the Petroleum Industry, 61 ANTITRUST L.J. 559, 567 (1993) (discussing the case
in which this consent decree was approved).
316. See, e.g., HARDWiCKE ET AL., supra note 293, at 175 ("[A]ntitrust laws do not
condemn the making and the carrying out of agreements for the unit operation of oil or gas
pools which are reasonably necessary to prevent waste and protect correlative rights.").
Hardwicke argued that should a conflict arise between waste-minimizing unitization and
antitrust principles, courts would likely interpret the antitrust laws so as to make them
"inapplicable" to such arrangements. Id. In Texas, however, the law clearly establishes the
opposite presumption: Insofar as unitization rules and antitrust conflict, antitrust principles
trump. See WEAVER, supra note 303, at 303 (explaining that if a court finds a conflict between
Texas unitization and antitrust legislation, it should invalidate the unitization provision).
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disincentive. 31 7 As in the fishery context, the very possibility of prosecution
chilled cooperative behavior that would have otherwise occurred.318
Professor Libecap and others suggest that there were substantial obstacles
to the adoption of voluntary unitization schemes, such as the knowledge and
transaction costs required for such arrangements. 319 These obstacles, Libecap's
analyses suggest, were the primary barrier to more widespread implementation
of cooperative developments.320 The point of this discussion is not to contest
Libecap's claim. Rather it is to suggest that, on the margin, there were fewer
unitization agreements and other private contractual efforts to enhance the
efficiency of oil extraction by slowing the rate of development than there would
have been without the specter of antitrust prosecution. The precise extent to
which such laws discouraged unitization arrangements is unclear, but there are
reasons to suspect that the effect may have been substantial. Between 1949 and
1978, after the adoption of Texas' initial voluntary unitization law, oil
developers entered into over 1,000 unitization agreements in Texas.32' This
figure demonstrates that where there are substantial potential gains from
cooperative action, individual property owners are often capable of entering
into cooperative agreements for mutual advantage, even where such agreements
are costly to maintain and may yield uncertain benefits.322
The available evidence suggests that absent the risk of antitrust
prosecution, "there would have been many more cooperative agreements and
greater scientific interest in the new theories of reservoir development.
3 23
317. See I BRADLEY, supra note 286, at 123 (noting the deterrent effect that the potential
for prosecution had on oil companies). In at least one instance, industry executives sought
assurances from state officials that cooperative oil development would not be prosecuted. They
were denied. See id. at 124 (citing experience of Humble Oil & Refining Co.).
318. It is also possible that active antitrust prosecutions of oil industry activities in other
areas generally increased the industry's sensitivity to antitrust concerns.
319. See generally Libecap, supra note 285 (exploring the political contracting involved in
attempts to change private property rights into natural resources); Libecap & Smith, supra note
311 (discussing obstacles that prevent pareto-optimal outcomes in the context of oil field
development); Libecap & Wiggins, Contractual Responses, supra note 287 (analyzing
disparities in bargaining positions that hinder private efforts to unitize); Libecap & Wiggins, Oil
Field Unitization, supra note 286 (describing reasons why private negotiations to unitize fail).
320. See Libecap, supra note 285, at 147 (explaining that high transaction costs, such as
the resolution of information asymmetries among invested parties, deter coordinated behavior
that would likely occur in a transaction cost-free environment).
321. See I BRADLEY, supra note 286, at 208 (demonstrating the presence of voluntary
unitization "despite incentives for small-tract drilling that remained until the 1960s").
322. See, e.g., WEAVER, supra note 303, at 248 (noting means to reduce holdout problems
that could scuttle otherwise profitable voluntary agreements).
323. 1 BRADLEY, supra note 286, at 130. Bradley is quick to note, however, that the
absence of such legal obstacles would not have produced perfectly efficient resource
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Bradley suggests that the push for mandatory unitization of oil fields was the
result, at least in part, of antitrust obstacles to cooperative resource
development.324 Insofar as antitrust laws discouraged voluntary unitization and
other cooperative strategies, regulatory measures, such as compulsory
unitization laws, became more necessary. Yet, as noted above, compulsory
unitization imposed a uniform approach when site-specific arrangements would
have been more beneficial. 25 It should also be noted that moving from a
private, contractual to a political, compulsory approach to oil reservoir
management does not eliminate the associated transaction costs. The primary
cost associated with unitization agreements, knowledge about the underground
326reservoir, remains.
B. Pollution Control
Pollution problems are often viewed as distinct from commons problems,
but this need not be the case. Local airsheds and watersheds may be conceived
of as environmental commons just like the fishery or common pasture.327 As
with the pasture, the airshed is used-or the purity of the air therein is
"consumed"-by the emission of pollution by factories. As Hardin noted, in
the pollution context, "it is not a question of taking something out, but of
putting something in. 3 28 The physical flow of material may be different, but
the incentives each individual user faces are the same. Each user gets the full
benefit of disposing his wastes into the common resource while the cost of such
disposal on the underlying resource is dispersed among all of the users.329
development due to transaction costs and the potential for entrepreneurial error. Id.; see also id.
at 210 (noting the information costs associated with unitization agreements).
324. See id. at 205 (explaining the efficiency gains associated with mandatory unitization).
325. See supra note 295-96, 311 and accompanying text (describing the inefficiencies
created by compulsory unitization).
326. See I BRADLEY, supra note 286, at 210 (noting that voluntary unitization fails to
eliminate the problem of "perfect knowledge about the reservoir and relative shares of the
surface owners above it").
327. See Hardin, supra note 30, at 1244-45 (offering examples of various environmental
commons, including pastures, oceans, and national parks).
328. Id. at 1245.
329. As Hardin explained:
The rational man finds that his share of the cost of the wastes he discharges into the
commons is less than the cost of purifying the wastes before releasing them. Since
this is true for everyone, we are locked into a system of 'fouling our own nest,' so
long as we behave only as independent, rational, free-enterprisers.
CONSER VA TION THROUGH COLLUSION
To see how the antitrust concern might arise,.consider a somewhat stylized
example of several industrial facilities within the same industry-perhaps
several timber mills-located in a single river basin.330 All of the facilities are
relatively similar-producing the same end products and discharging similar
effluents into the river. Water quality in the river basin is primarily a function
of the aggregate discharge into the river over a given period of time, rather than
the discharge of any specific firm. If the water quality in the river does not
meet applicable standards, a binding constraint on aggregate discharge, such as
a "Total Maximum Daily Load" (TMDL) under the federal Clean Water Act,
may be imposed.3 3' Failure to meet the regulatory limit could result in the
imposition of more draconian discharge standards on each individual facility-
standards that each facility may wish to discharge.
Faced with the prospect of more stringent discharge standards or other
sanctions, the firms in question might opt to create an association or other
collective enterprise to ensure that aggregate discharge falls below the relevant
limit.332 Assuming the unavailability of other means of meeting the aggregate
discharge constraint, such as the purchase of emission credits or funding of
nonpoint source controls, the firms could agree to reduce their output so as to
ensure that their discharges, in aggregate, remain below the relevant limit.
333
330. This hypothetical is loosely based on that suggested by Professor Yandle with regard
to Wisconsin's Fox River. See Yandle, supra note 12 1, at 49-50 (explaining that a binding
restraint on output among paper producers on the river results in an improvement in water
quality).
331. See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(c) (2000) (requiring states to establish limits on the
amount of pollutants that may be discharged into certain bodies of water within their respective
boundaries).
332. See David W. Riggs & Bruce Yandle, Environmental Quality, Biological Envelopes,
and River Basin Markets, in WATER MARKETING-Tm NExT GENERATION 147, 154-62 (Terry
L. Anderson & Peter J. Hill eds., 1997) (discussing the development of the Tar-Pamlico
Association). It is important to stress that the incentive for the creation of the collective
association in this example comes from the imposition of a binding restraint on aggregate water
pollution. As occurred in the Tar-Pamlico example, firms are not motivated by environmental
concern, as such, but by a desire to reduce the regulatory burden. Absent some sort of binding
constraint, whether imposed by federal regulation or some other means, there would be no
incentive to create a collective entity for the purpose of reducing aggregate pollution levels in
the watershed.
333. In theory, the firms would agree to a limit on their discharges, as such, and then
restrict output to meet the limit. Given the cost and difficulty of measuring discharges on a
continuous basis, it is possible that the firms' agreement would focus on a more readily
measurable proxy, such as industrial output, to ensure compliance with the agreement. Such
proxies for actual emissions are sometimes used by regulatory agencies to monitor compliance.
The EPA, for example, has sought to use heat input as the basis for emission projections. See
Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 249 F.3d 1032, 1051 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (upholding the EPA's
use of heat input as a proxy of projecting emission levels).
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Yet, this is just the sort of agreement-an agreement to limit output with the
potential to reduce consumer welfare by increasing prices-that would be
suspect under antitrust principles. As Kneese and Bower observed:
[T]he internalization of externalities into a private decision-making unit for
an entire basin would most probably result in changes in market structure
(monopolization) contrary to social policy and inconsistent with efficient
production because of its market power.
Hence, the conflict between environmental concerns and antitrust principles
again moves to the fore. For environmental purposes, it may be desirable to
have a single entity-such as a single firm or association-that is responsible
for output decisions for an entire river basin. 35 Yet, the creation of such an
association, absent express government authorization, would also raise antitrust
concerns. 336 As in the conservation context, environmental concerns could
encourage the same sort of output limitations antitrust condemns.
337
VI. Reconciling Competition Concerns with Conservation
Antitrust law has evolved substantially since the prosecutions of the
GCSOA and Monterey Sardine. 33 ' There is a growing recognition that many
334. ALLEN V. KNEESE & BLAIR T. BOWER, MANAGING WATER QUALITY: ECONOMICS,
TECHNOLOGY, INSTITUTIONS 90 (1968).
335. See Riggs & Yandle, supra note 332, at 149 (explaining the significant role that river
basins play in achieving better water quality). Some analysts argue that the failure to adopt
regional, river basin or watershed-based institutions for pollution control was "the most
profound deficiency" of the initial federal statutes. ALLEN V. KNEESE & CHARLES T. SCHULZE,
POLLUTION, PIaCES, AND PUBLIC POLICY 45 (1975).
336. See Riggs & Yandle, supra note 332, at 150-51 (noting the monopoly problem that
accompanies one firm's domination of market share). The antitrust considerations arise where
the facilities in question are in a common industry so that a decision to limit output would
reduce the output of a given product. Where the facilities in question are all parts of different
industries, there would be less concern that a river basin association could act as a regional
monopoly.
337. Some observers have noted that the move toward voluntary industry environmental
standards could generate conflict between antitrust laws and environmental goals. See, e.g.,
Jane C. Luxton et al., Voluntary Environmental Undertakings: An Antitrust Alert, 17 DAILY
ENvTL. REP. (BNA) B-I, at B-4-B-5 (Sept. 4,2002) (listing four instances where environmental
law and antitrust law likely conflict). While the application of antitrust law as described above
may, at times, frustrate the pursuit of some environmental goals, such problems are analytically
distinct from the focus of this article. Concerns about joint ventures, cooperative research, and
the like do not involve the same inherent tension as does the conflict between private
cooperative solutions to commons problems and antitrust law.
338. See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Rationalization ofAntitrust, 116 HARV. L. REv. 917,
927 (2003) (reviewing POSNER, supra note 103) (noting the centrist positions that courts have
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arrangements that appear anticompetitive have the potential to enhance
consumer welfare. Where courts once rigidly applied per se rules to condemn a
wide range of cooperative conduct among firms, they are now willing to take a
closer look at the potential economic benefits of cooperative behavior. 39 The
apparent dichotomy between the per se rule and the rule of reason has become
"less fixed" as courts have moved away from bright line approaches to antitrust
analysis.340 Indeed, some commentators go so far as to suggest that the per se
rule is dead and "there is only one form of analysis, the rule of reason.
341
Whether or not this view accurately characterizes the state of antitrust analysis,
it is clear that many arrangements once condemned as anticompetitive are now
recognized as permissible economic arrangements.
This increased appreciation of the potential for otherwise anticompetitive
arrangements to serve broader societal goals suggests that courts should
reconsider the per se condemnation of cooperative fishery management. While
such conduct may appear anticompetitive, and may even reduce output in some
cases, it also has the potential to serve conservation goals, and thereby enhance
total welfare. For this reason, cooperative efforts to limit or otherwise control
fish catch should be analyzed under the rule of reason. 42 Such a shift in
taken to antitrust law over the past two decades); see also James B. Kobak, Jr., Running the
Gauntlet: Antitrust and Intellectual Property Pitfalls on the Two Sides of the Atlantic, 64
ANTITRUST L.J. 341, 345 (1996) (noting that U.S. antitrust law has become "more flexible and,
in general, more permissive"); William E. Kovacic, Reagan's Judicial Appointees andAntitrust
in the 1990s, 60 FoRDHAm L. REv. 49, 98 (1991) (noting a general trend toward "more
permissive" liability standards in much of antitrust law).
339. See Kovacic, supra note 338, at 98 (listing specific issues within antitrust law where
the court has relaxed its rules against firms).
340. See Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 779 (1999) ("The truth is that our
categories of analysis of anticompetitive effects are less fixed than terms like 'per se,' 'quick
look,' and rule of reason tend to make them appear."). The Federal Trade Commission first
moved away from a "bright line" approach in In re Massachusetts Board of Registration in
Optometry, I 10 F.T.C. 549,603-04 (1988) (describing the general trend in cases away from the
traditional "tidy rules" of antitrust jurisprudence). See also Timothy J. Muris, The New Rule of
Reason, 57 ANrrrgusr L.J. 859,859 (1988) [hereinafter Muris, Rule of Reason] (discussing that
antitrust law requires only one type of analysis).
341. Muris, Rule ofReason, supra note 340, at 859. See also Timothy J. Muris, California
Dental Association v. Federal Trade Commission: The Revenge of Footnote 17, 8 SuP. CT.
ECON. REv. 265, 304-06 (2000) [hereinafter Muris, California Dental] (arguing that the
"supposed dichotomy" between the per se rule and the rule of reason has been replaced with a
"the rule of reason as a continuum").
342. While this Article focuses on fisheries, this analysis applies equally in other common
pool resource contexts, suggesting that the rule of reason should be applied whenever there are
private arrangements that serve to reduce consumption of a common-pool resource that would
be otherwise subject to depletion.
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approach is largely consistent with contemporary antitrust doctrine and would
enhance the prospects for sustainable fishery management.
To date, courts have not been asked to address this question directly.
There are no cases evaluating efforts to solve coordination problems in the
context of an open-access commons; indeed there are no reported antitrust
cases even addressing conservation concerns in the fishery context over the last
thirty years.343 The cases condemning voluntary efforts to reduce or control
fish catch have yet to be called into question, let alone overturned. As the law
stands, efforts to conserve marine fisheries through private, cooperative efforts
risk prosecution under the Sherman Act. Federal antitrust authorities could
help facilitate the acceptance of collaborative conservation efforts, but they
cannot immunize such arrangements from antitrust scrutiny.344 Should the
courts fail to apply the rule of reason to conservation-enhancing agreements
among resource users, however, statutory reforms could be considered. Yet, a
statutory "fix" has the potential of imposing a "one-size-fits-all" rule in an area
where context-specific judgments may be more appropriate.
A. Conservation and the Rule of Reason
Under the rule of reason, courts recognize that otherwise anticompetitive
arrangements can have offsetting efficiency benefits. Courts seek to balance
the tendency of any given arrangement to produce both anticompetitive and
efficiency enhancing effects so as to maximize aggregate social welfare.
34
This balancing of anticompetitive effects with efficiency gains from various
arrangements is now common in many parts of antitrust law, including
arrangements that primarily serve to control opportunistic behavior.
Transactional efficiencies often result when arrangements constrain the
potential for opportunistic behavior.3 46 Yet, such arrangements can also prove
343. The closest are a handful of cases addressing the impact of fishery consolidation under
ITQ management. See Ace Lobster Co. v. Evans, 165 F. Supp. 2d 148, 170-84 (D.R.I. 2001)
(evaluating lobster trap cap regulations); J.H. Miles & Co. v. Brown, 910 F. Supp. 1138, 1154-
60 (E.D. Va. 1995) (examining commercial catch quotas); Sea Watch Int'l v. Mosbacher, 762 F.
Supp. 370, 375-80 (D.D.C. 1991) (examining an individual transferable quota system for
particular fisheries).
344. See, e.g., Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 13 ("A
consent judgment, even one entered at the behest of the Antitrust Division, does not immunize
the defendant from liability for actions, including those contemplated by the decree, that violate
the rights of nonparties.").
345. See supra notes 102-05 and accompanying text (noting the prominent role that the
rule of reason has assumed in antitrust law).
346. See Wesley J. Liebeler, 1984 Economic Review of Antitrust Developments:
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anticompetitive. Balancing these two potential effects is the role of the rule of
reason.
Economic cooperation among potential competitors is often necessary, as
"some activities can only be carried out jointly. 347 Therefore, firms must
sometimes act in concert with potential competitors or other firms that at least
have the potential to be competitors in the future. For this cooperation to occur,
the firms need some assurance that members will honor their arrangement.
This assurance creates the need for ancillary restraints to prevent one party to
the arrangement from opportunistically talcing advantage of the others. The
difficulty is differentiating those arrangements that serve to protect legitimate
business arrangements from opportunistic behavior and efforts to generate
monopoly rents.14' The former such arrangements should be evaluated under
the rule of reason, while the latter may be held illegal under the per se rule.
At a basic level, all commercial agreements "restrain" trade, in that they
regulate commercial conduct or otherwise bind the parties to engage in or
refrain from particular activities. The key analytical difficulty is to identify
which agreements restrain trade in violation of the antitrust laws and which are
merely ancillary to other legitimate purposes. This identification is the purpose
of the ancillary restraints doctrine first articulated by then-Judge William
Howard Taft in United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co.349 To avoid
antitrust condemnation, the restraint
[M]ust be one in which there is a main purpose, to which the covenant in
restraint of trade is merely ancillary. The covenant is inserted only to
protect one of the parties from the injury which, in the execution of the
Horizontal Restrictions, Efficiency, and the Per Se Rule, 33 UCLA L. REv. 1019, 1021-22
(1986) [hereinafter Liebeler, 1984 Economic Review] (discussing instances where the court
considered the efficiencies created by an arrangement when evaluating it under a per se rule).
347. BORK, supra note 102, at 278. Of course, observers will not always be aware of the
need for or benefits of such arrangements. Yet, this lack of awareness will not prevent claims of
anticompetitive conduct. As Ronald Coase noted, "[l]f an economist finds something-a
business practice of one sort or another-that he does not understand, he looks for a monopoly
explanation." R.H. COASE, Industrial Organization: A Proposalfor Research, in PoLIcY ISSUES
AND RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES IN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 59, 67 (Victor Fuchs ed., 1972).
348. See Liebeler, 1984 Economic Review, supra note 346, at 1024 ("Since opportunistic
behavior takes many forms, so will cost effective protections against it. These precautions
sometimes take forms that appear to violate the antitrust laws. It is important not to confuse
arrangements designed to reduce opportunism with those designed to restrict output.").
349. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898). Robert H.
Bork refers to Judge Taft's Addyston Pipe opinion as "one of the greatest, if not the greatest,
antitrust opinions in the history of the law." BORK, supra note 102, at 26.
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contract or enjoyment of its fruits, he may suffer from the unrestrained
competition of the other. 350
In addition, the restraint must not exceed "the necessity presented by the main
purpose of the contract. 351 In other words, the arrangement in question must
be necessary to facilitate a legitimate business enterprise by limiting the
potential for opportunistic conduct, the threat of which would frustrate the
underlying business purpose. 5 2
Examples of such ancillary restraints include an agreement by the seller of
a business not to compete against the business being sold, a noncompete
contract between an employer and her former employee, or an agreement
between business partners not to compete against the partnership. 53 In a literal
sense, each of these agreements restrains trade, as each prevents individuals or
firms from engaging in potentially productive economic activity and
exchange. 4 At the same time, any of these agreements can represent a
350. Addyston Pipe, 85 F. at 282. When Judge Taft wrote "unrestrained competition," he
could just as easily have written "opportunistic behavior." Liebeler, 1984 Economic Review,
supra note 346, at 1027.
351. Addyston Pipe, 85 F. at 282.
352. That an agreement seeks to control opportunistic conduct is not enough by itself, as all
cartel arrangements are, at heart, an effort to control opportunistic conduct insofar as they are
designed to prevent members of the cartel from shirking or otherwise seeking to take advantage
of other cartel members by violating the cartel's terms. As Professor Liebeler summarizes:
Restraints that facilitate a contract's main purpose and that are not broader than
reasonably necessary are to bejudged on the same basis as the contract itself Ifthe
contract is legal, so is the ancillary restraint, no matter what form either the contract
or its ancillary restraint might take.
Liebeler, 1984 Economic Review, supra note 346, at 1029. Or, in the words of then-Judge
Robert Bork:
To be ancillary, and hence exempt from the per se rule, an agreement eliminating
competition must be subordinate and collateral to a separate, legitimate transaction.
The ancillary restraint is subordinate and collateral in the sense that it serves to
make the main transaction more effective in accomplishing its purpose.
Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 224 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
353. The other examples identified by Judge Taft are an agreement among business
partners not to compete against one another upon termination of the partnership and an
agreement by the buyer of property not to use the property in competition with the seller. See
Addyston Pipe, 85 F. at 281 (listing these examples).
354. See Polk Bros. v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 776 F.2d 185, 189 (7th Cir. 1985). As the
court states:
The evaluation of ancillary restraints under the Rule of Reason does not imply that
ancillary agreements are not real horizontal restraints. A covenant not to compete
following employment does not operate any differently from a horizontal market
division among competitors-not at the time the covenant has its bite, anyway.
The difference comes at the time people enter beneficial arrangements.
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legitimate effort to control opportunistic behavior by firms that seek to
collaborate to achieve a common objective other than the restraint of trade. A
seller of property who is unable to secure a commitment from potential buyers
not to use the property in competition with the seller may opt not to sell the
property at all. If prospective partners in a joint venture are unable to commit
not to compete with one another in the area of the partnership, then they may
never collaborate. Where such collaborative endeavors are beneficial, an
antitrust rule that imposes a blanket prohibition on such arrangements will not
maximize general welfare.3 5
Resource depletion in an open-access commons presents a fairly
traditional free-rider problem in which opportunistic behavior holds the
potential to harm all of the resource users, yet no single user has any incentive
to refrain from opportunistic behavior because she has no guarantee that other
users will do the same. Quite the opposite, each user of an open-access
commons has good reasons to suspect that other users will act opportunistically.
When each user responds to these incentives, all maximize their use of the
underlying resource, leading to over-consumption and excessive resource
depletion.35 6 In the case of fisheries, the end result is often fishery collapse.
This sort of free-rider problem is nothing new in antitrust law. For
example, "many intrabrand agreements on price or price levels can create
efficiency by alleviating free rider problems. 35 7 Consider the producer of
name-brand appliance products that only sells through independent retailers.358
There is substantial value in the brand name of the product that the producer
may wish to protect by ensuring that customers receive a minimum level of
customer service, post-purchase care, and the like. Yet, each independent
retailer has an incentive to shirk on the provision of such services and undercut
the price of his competitors in the market. When a retailer engages in such
Id.
355. As Judge Easterbrook noted in Polk Brothers, "A legal rule that enforces covenants
not to compete, even after an employee has launched his own firm, makes it easier for people to
cooperate productively in the first place." Id. The relevant issue for a court is whether such an
agreement "promoted enterprise and productivity at the time it was adopted." Id.
356. See supra notes 24-35 and accompanying text (discussing problems that arise with
unregulated use of a common resource).
357. Wesley J. Liebeler, Resale Price Maintenance and Consumer Welfare: Business
Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 36 UCLA L. REv. 889, 898 (1989) [hereinafter
Liebeler, Resale Price Maintenance].
358. This scenario is loosely modeled on Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S.
36 (1977), in which the Supreme Court applied the rule of reason to evaluate intrabrand
distribution restraints imposed by a television manufacturer on retail franchisees. See also
Liebeler, Resale Price Maintenance, supra note 357, at 897-903 (describing the potential for
cartel behavior to occur in this type of situation).
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behavior, she captures the full economic benefit of her behavior. Insofar as her
actions reduce, or "deplete," the value of the brand name in the relevant market,
the costs are spread across all of the retailers for the product, as well as the
producer. As with the user of the open-access commons, the retailer has the
incentive to engage in opportunistic behavior because the benefits are
concentrated, yet the costs are dispersed.
To address this concern, a name-brand producer may limit the number of
independent retailers that may sell the product, and it may also impose a variety
of conditions on the sale of the product, ranging from product displays, sale
promotions, customer service guarantees, post-purchase care, and so on. To
further limit shirking, the name-brand producer may further grant exclusive
sales regions and set minimum prices so as to prevent intrabrand retail price
competition that could encourage shirking. These restrictions, which at one
level may seem anticompetitive, can all be seen as efforts to prevent depletion
of the value of the brand name through opportunistic behavior by individual
producers, much as restrictions adopted by fishing unions can be designed to
limit opportunistic behavior that depletes the open-access fishery.
Within Judge Taft's framework for ancillary restraints, the restrictions
imposed by fishing unions and fisher associations can be recognized as
agreements among partners not to compete against the partnership.
35 9
[W]hen two men became partners in a business, although their union might
reduce competition, this effect was only an incident to the main purpose of
a union of their capital, enterprise, and energy to carry on a successful
business, and one useful to the comnmunity. Restrictions in the articles of
partnership upon the business activity of the members, with a view of
securing their entire effort in the common enterprise, were, of course only
ancillary to the main end of the union, and were to be encouraged.)3
°
The problem of opportunistic behavior can arise when partners are required to
invest in the partnership to prevent some partners from free-riding on the
investments made by the others. 6'
In the fishery context, the partnership benefits from all participants
reducing their catch so as to ensure that the aggregate catch does not exceed the
maximum sustainable yield of the fishery. This forbearance on the part of each
partner represents an investment in the long-run health of the fishery, and
359. See United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 280 (6th Cir. 1898)
(noting that certain agreements that restrain trade are economically desirable).
360. Id.
361. See Liebeler, 1984 Economic Review, supra note 346, at 1028 ("It is desirable that all
the partners develop goodwill specific to the partnership, but there is also a danger tha[t] some
of the partners will try to divert that goodwill to their own benefit.").
CONSER VA TION THROUGH COLLUSION
therefore an investment in the well-being of the partnership. 362 Short-term
efficiency is sacrificed in return for long-term efficiency. Yet, as in any open-
access commons, each participant has an incentive to free-ride on the
conservation efforts of the other participants and increase his own individual
catch. Should each participant act in this fashion-in effect, competing against
the partnership-the fishery is depleted. Thus, it becomes necessary for the
partnership to adopt binding restraints on the amount of fish each participant
may catch.
Were it simply enough for fishery associations to set catch limits, it might
be easy to condemn the other restraints adopted by Monterey Sardine, GCSOA,
and the other fishers associations as anticompetitive.363 Yet, it is not enough to
adopt the simple horizontal restraint to protect the partnership. Because of the
incentive to cheat, the restraint must be enforced. Participants in a given
fishery may agree to catch limits, but there is no assurance that they will abide
by the limitations. As with any cartel, there is tremendous incentive to cheat.
Indeed, the more successful the partnership is at controlling the catch, the
greater incentive there is to cheat. 3 4 In a marine fishery, cheating is difficult to
control. The activities and catches of individual boats are difficult to
monitor.365 It is easier to police landings or sales to canneries, particularly as
there will typically be fewer canneries than fishers. Thus, the fishing
association enters into contracts with the canneries to monitor or control the
volume of fish caught. Minimum prices can help maintain fisher income-
potentially reducing the incentive to cheat. They will also reduce the quantity
of fish that canneries will purchase. Thus, the vertical aspects of the
arrangement-the contracts between the fishermen and the canneries-serve to
help control shirking and free-riding by individual fishers.
Another threat to the viability of such a partnership in a marine fishery is
the entrance of outsiders. So long as there is open access to the fishery,
conservation efforts remain a questionable investment. A fishing association
cannot limit the catch if nonmember fishers are free to catch fish from the same
362. See Townsend, supra note 53, at 43 (noting that the decision to defer or reduce
harvest is an investment by fishers in the fishery).
363. See supra Parts IV.A-B and accompanying text (describing agreements within the
fishery context that were held to be in violation of the Sherman Act).
364. On the incentives created by cartels, see generally ALEXIS JACQUEMIN & MARGARET
SLADE, Cartels, Collusion, and Horizontal Merger, in I HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL
ORGANIZATIONS 415,425-30 (RICHARD Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig eds., 1989).
365. See Christopher J. Carr & Harry N. Scheiber, Dealing with a Resource Crisis:
Regulatory Regimesfor Managing the World's Marine Fisheries, 21 STAN. ENvTL. L.J. 45,58-
62 (2002) (detailing the difficulty of enforcing catch levels on the high seas).
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fishery.366 The fishers' partnership addresses this concern by making contracts
with canneries exclusive, so that nonmember fishers cannot sell their fish in
competition with the partnership. Such contracts protect the partnership by
protecting the partnership's investment in the conservation of the fishery.
Unlike those restraints above, however, such agreements cannot be described as
efforts by the partnership solely intended to prevent partners from competing
against the partnership, as the excluded fishers are, by definition, not partners
in the fishery. This conclusion does not mean that the restrictions cannot be
viewed as ancillary to the underlying purpose of conserving the fishery. If such
conservation measures ensure a long-run supply of fish, they may be welfare-
enhancing, the harm to individually excluded fishers notwithstanding.3 67 As
noted above, the short-term efficiency losses caused by the exclusion may be
outweighed by the long-term efficiency gains from conserving the underlying
resource and maximizing resource output over time. Protecting an individual
fishery from depletion may be pro-competitive insofar as it maintains the
fishery as a viable source of fish for consumers. This benefit does not mean
that all such arrangements should necessarily be legal under federal antitrust
laws.368 It does, however, suggest that a court should evaluate such
arrangements under the rule of reason, and weigh their potential
anticompetitive effects against their potential to prevent a tragedy of the
commons.
The Supreme Court has been willing to allow even the most potentially
anticompetitive arrangements where there was evidence that such arrangements
would be welfare enhancing, including horizontal price fixing. Historically,
horizontal price fixing was the sort of activity most likely to be condemned as
per se illegal under the Sherman Act because price fixing so often reduces
output. Nonetheless, "horizontal price fixing as well as other types of
horizontal restraints are illegal per se only if they generally restrict output rather
than create efficiency."369 In Broadcast Music Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting
System,37° the Court even seemed to accept that formal arrangements to set
366. Indeed, insofar as a fishing association is successful at limiting the fishing effort of its
own members, it is likely to increase the incentive for nonmember fishers to enter the fishery.
367. It must be remembered that for conduct to be anticompetitive, "it must harm the
competitive process and thereby harm consumers... [h]arm to one or more competitors will not
suffice." United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 58 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (per curiam).
368. See, e.g., NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 98-120 (1984)
(striking down as a violation of the Sherman Act an NCAA plan to reduce the competition
between televising football games and attendance at football games).
369. Liebeler, Resale Price Maintenance, supra note 357, at 892.
370. Broad. Music Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
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prices might nonetheless merit analysis under the rule of reason and survive
judicial scrutiny, particularly when, as in the fishery context, the arrangement
functions as a partnership in pursuit of a legitimate business end.37'
Broadcast Music concerned the issuance of blanket licenses to
copyrighted songs by the American Society of Composers, Authors, and
Publishers (ASCAP) and Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI).3 72  Under these
arrangements, ASCAP and BMI would license the right to perform any and all
compositions within their respective catalogs for a set fee.3 73 Blanket licenses
had the effect of "fixing" the prices for which songs were sold. At the same
time, blanket licenses facilitated the sale and enforcement of music rights, in
large part by reducing the transaction costs of music sales in a marketplace with
"thousands of users, thousands of copyright owners, and millions of
compositions. 
3 74
The Court eschewed a formulaic approach to antitrust analysis and
reasoned that "[n]ot all arrangements among actual or potential competitors that
have an impact on price are per se violations of the Sherman Act or even
unreasonable restraints., 375 Joint ventures, for example, are not illegal, even
where the venture "fixes" a price for the product the common enterprise
produces, "where the agreement on price is necessary to market the product at
all. 376 While the ASCAP and BMI blanket licenses may have entailed "'price
fixing' in the literal sense," the Court found that this practice did not belong in
the "categories of business behavior to which the per se rule has been held
applicable. 377 As partners, the organizations were "literally 'price fixing,"'
when they set their respective prices, "but they are not per se in violation of the
Sherman Act. 378 "Literalness is overly simplistic and often overbroad, 379 the
Court cautioned, as "easy labels do not always supply ready answers.
380
371. See id. at 9 ("When two partners set the price of their goods or services they are
literally 'price fixing,' but they are not per se in violation of the Sherman Act.").
372. Id. at4.
373. The fees were typically either a percentage of the licensee's revenue or a flat dollar
amount, but did "not directly depend on the amount or type of music used." Id. at 5.
374. See id. at 20 (describing how blanket licenses effected the market for copyrighted
music).





380. Id. at 8.
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The Court recognized that the blanket licenses, as used by ASCAP and
BMI, were "not a 'naked restrain[t] of trade with no purpose except stifling of
competition." 3" To the contrary, the licenses "accompanie[d] the integration
of sales, monitoring, and enforcement against unauthorized copyright use."
3 2
Even if BMI and ASCAP's use of blanket licenses discouraged some sales,
there was little doubt the net effect of the practice was to increase the sale of
music performance rights. 3 By rejecting the application of the per se rule to
ASCAP's and BMI's use of blanket licenses, the Court did not seek to
immunize them from antitrust scrutiny. Rather, the Court explained, the
practices "should be subjected to a more discriminating examination under the
rule of reason"-an examination that may well condemn the arrangements.38 4
The Court reiterated its prior holdings that some arrangements are "so 'plainly
anticompetitive'" 38 ' and "so often 'lack ... any redeeming virtue"'3 6 that they
may be presumed illegal with the most cursory examination.3" 7 It nonetheless
made clear that a practice that fixed prices does not necessarily "lack... any
redeeming virtue," and could, nonetheless, have a pro-competitive
justification.
38
The Court similarly demonstrated its willingness to consider the potential
welfare benefits of horizontal restraints in a challenge to the National Collegiate
Athletic Association (NCAA) policies governing college football telecasts.8 9
The NCAA sought to fix the price for college football telecasts and limit the
number of television exposures in a single season for any given team.3 90 There
was no question that this arrangement both fixed prices and reduced output.391
"Because it restrains price and output, the NCAA's television plan has a
381. Id. at 20 (quoting White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963)).
382. Id.
383. See id. at 20-21 (explaining that blanket licenses increase efficiencies in the
copyrighted music market, thereby lowering costs and boosting sales).
384. Id. at 24.
385. Id. at 8 (quoting Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'I Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692
(1978)).
386. Id. (quoting N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. I, 5 (1958)).
387. See id. at 24 (reviewing cases in which the Court found practices to be presumptively
illegal without requiring application of the rule of reason).
388. See id. at 20-21 (explaining how blanket licenses can facilitate competition in the
copyrighted music market).
389. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
390. See id. at 91-94 (describing the NCAA's television plan).
391. Id. at 107 ("Price is higher and output lower than they would otherwise be, and both
are unresponsive to consumer preference.").
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significant potential for anticompetitive effects."'3 92 Despite this finding, the
Court found "it would be inappropriate to apply a per se rule" to the NCAA's
practices.393
While many of the NCAA's rules took the form of anticompetitive
restrictions on member behavior, it was also clear that the NCAA performed a
useful function in constraining the behavior of member institutions in pursuit of
otherwise legitimate purposes.394 For instance, the NCAA adopted numerous
rules designed to maintain amateurism in college athletics and prevent athletic
programs from eclipsing the educational missions of member institutions.395 In
a sense, one could view many of the NCAA's policies as efforts to define and
protect "college football" as a marketable product distinct from professional
football and other competitive sports. 396 In the process, the NCAA imposed
rules on member institutions that no member could undertake unilaterally
without damaging its competitiveness on the field.397 For example, a school
that limited practice time so as not to unduly interfere with athletes' studies
would be at a disadvantage as against other schools that refused to do the same.
By imposing common rules on all member institutions, the NCAA facilitated
the success of the common enterprise. "In performing this role, its actions
widen consumer choice-not only the choices available to sports fans but also
those available to athletes-and hence can be viewed as procompetitive.
398
Thus, measures that appear anticompetitive or inefficient in the short-term can
be efficient insofar as they maximize long-term output by ensuring the
continued existence of a valuable resource-whether that is college sports, as in
this case, or a marine fishery.
392. Id. at 104. The Court further noted:
By participating in an association which prevents member institutions from
competing against each other on the basis of price or kind of television rights that
can be offered to broadcasters, the NCAA member institutions have created a
horizontal restraint--an agreement among competitors on the way in which they
will compete with one another.
Id. at 99.
393. Id. at 100.
394. See id. at 101-02 (explaining why the NCAA must restrict competition if it is to be
able to market its product).
395. See id. at 102 (discussing how the NCAA has adopted rules to maintain the amateur
character of collegiate sports).
396. Id. at 101-02 ("[W]hat is critical is that this case involves an industry in which
horizontal restraints on competition are essential if the product is to be available at all.").
397. See id. at 102 (listing rules the NCAA implemented which individual universities
could not risk unilaterally adopting).
398. Id.
61 WASH. & LEE L. REV 3 (2004)
Under the rule of reason, the Court recognized that the NCAA would be
justified in adopting many restrictions on the conduct of its members. 99 Yet,
the rule of reason does not give associations a blank check. Practices that serve
to reduce output and increase prices-as the NCAA's policies on college
football telecasts-must be reasonably necessary for the achievement of a
legitimate business purpose. While horizontal restrictions governing the rules
and conduct of the game are defensible on such grounds, limits on the output of
game telecasts were not.400 Key to the rule of reason analysis is distinguishing
between those restrictions that are reasonably necessary for legitimate business
purposes and those that are purely anticompetitive.
While the analyses in BMI and NCAA suggest that it would be appropriate
to analyze cooperative approaches to fishery management under the rule of
reason, the Supreme Court's antitrustjurisprudence is sufficiently muddled that
there are cases that might suggest otherwise. In Arizona v. Maricopa County
Medical Society,401 the Court invalidated an arrangement as anticompetitive
that arguably was an effort to control a common pool resource problem very
similar to that at issue in the fishery context. 402 Specifically, the Court found
that two physician associations committed antitrust violations by agreeing to
maximum fees under association-administered insurance plans. °3
The arrangement in Maricopa County was essentially an effort to control a
common pool problem created by the insurance reimbursement plan. In this
sense, it arguably was a partnership of the sort that should, at least in some
instances, be permissible under Addyston Pipe.4°4 The doctors adopted
maximum fees to limit opportunism. The insurance plan was, in a sense, a
common pool resource from which it would reimburse each participating doctor
for services provided. Under such an arrangement, each doctor would have
little incentive to control costs. 405 Indeed, each doctor would have the incentive
to charge higher prices for medical services so as to capture a greater share of
399. See id. at 101-02 (explaining why the NCAA would be justified in imposing some
restrictions on its members).
400. Liebeler, 1984 Economic Review, supra note 346, at 1055 ("There was no relationship
between the vast bulk of the NCAA's activities in promoting and regulating college football and
the price and output provisions of the television restrictions.").
401. Arizona v. Maricopa Cty. Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
402. Id. at 348.
403. See id. (applying the per se rule to strike down the agreement).
404. See Liebeler, 1984 Economic Review, supra note 346, at 1043-44 (explaining how
Maricopa County relates to Addyston Pipe).
405. See id. at 1035 (explaining that, absent price fixing, the doctors "would have had an
almost unlimited incentive to increase fees, driving up insurance premiums").
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the money in the plan.4 6 Should each participating doctor engage in such
behavior, the cost of maintaining the plan would skyrocket. 4 7 It would be the
tragedy of the commons all over again. From this standpoint, the maximum
price served to prevent over-consumption of the plan's resources so that it
could be sustained.40 8 Indeed, without the ability to control opportunistic
behavior, it is questionable whether the doctors would have entered into their
arrangement in the first place. 4°9 In Maricopa County, this argument was never
made in defense of the maximum price controls, and the arrangement was held
to be anticompetitive in violation of federal antitrust law.410
Where the Court has evaluated horizontal restraints under the rule of
reason, as in BMI and NCAA, it has recognized that the restraints at issue could
enhance consumer welfare.41 In these cases, the Court could conclude that the
restraints would ultimately enhance output, not reduce it. In the context of a
common pool resource, however, it is certain that horizontal arrangements will
restrict output, at least in the short-term. Indeed, in many respects, it is
precisely because such arrangements restrict output that they increase efficiency
by restraining consumption to more sustainable levels. Ifparties did not control
the consumption of the underlying resource, overexploitation would lead to
premature exhaustion of the resource. Thus, restrictions on resource
consumption in the present, while controlling output, can actually maximize
long run output. If courts can recognize that even horizontal agreements to set
prices have the potential to be welfare enhancing arrangements, in principle
406. The late Professor Liebeler compared the situation to that of a group of people who go
to a fancy restaurant and agree ex ante to split the bill equally irrespective of what any member
of the group orders. In this context, each member of the group has an incentive to order more
courses and more expensive dishes, as the added cost will be dispersed across all members of
the group. Moreover, the strength of the incentive correlates with the size of the group-the
larger the group, the greater the incentive to free ride in this fashion. Should all members of the
group respond to this incentive, however, the dinner bill will be exorbitant. Liebeler, 1984
Economic Review, supra note 346, at 1035.
407. See id. (describing why a doctor's wealth would decrease if other doctors in the plan
acted opportunistically).
408. See id. (stating that "[i]t is hard to see how... [the] insurance plan could exist
without maximum price controls").
409. See id. (stating that the persons would not have entered such plans without safeguards
to control opportunism).
410. See id. at 1034 ("[T]he defendants never offered any plausible explanation of how the
maximum prices contributed to the efficiency of the insurance plans.").
411. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 101-02 (1984)
(discussing how NCAA rules preserve collegiate sports as a product); Broad. Music Inc. v.
Columbia Broad. Sys., 441 U.S. 1,20-21 (1979) (explaining how blanket licenses facilitate the
copyrighted music market).
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there is no reason why they could not also consider the welfare benefits of
efforts to reduce the exploitation of open-access resources.
Although cooperative solutions to common pool resources problems
provide potential efficiency gains, it is doubtful that such gains are sufficient to
safeguard such arrangements under existing precedent. The potentially
anticompetitive nature of the specific arrangements could be fatal. Where
fisheries are in sufficient peril, however, the outcome may be different, as there
is precedent for allowing otherwise anticompetitive conduct in such situations
in order to preserve the underlying resource.
A local or regional fishery monopoly might create a less than ideal
situation. The relevant policy question, however, is whether it is worse than the
alternative. Any dead weight losses resulting from the accumulation and abuse
of market power in a fishery is likely to be less than the efficiency losses
resulting from open-access or inefficient government regulation. 2 Professor
Yandle is skeptical that the accumulation of market power in local or regional
fisheries is a serious concern at all: "In the absence of government sanctions
that block competitive entry, it is difficult to see how regional fishing
associations ... could effectively cartelize major product markets.
' 4'3
With global markets, fisheries will compete with one another-and with
other food sources-for market share. 414 This development should further
reduce the threat of market power. Under existing law, the relevant market for
antitrust analysis "must include all products 'reasonably interchangeable by
consumers for the same purposes.'" 41 ' This requirement would seem applicable
to many types of fish and seafood products. Shrimpers in the Gulf of Mexico
may well compete with shrimpers from overseas. There are real differences
between Alaskan King salmon on the one hand, and farm raised Atlantic
salmon on the other, but it is not at all clear that the differences mean there is
not a single market for fresh salmon.41 6 Were salmon fishers in the Pacific
Northwest able to reduce their catch substantially below the maximum
412. See Edwards, supra note 59, at 266 (reviewing studies that compare dead weight
losses resulting from monopolies to inefficiency losses resulting from open-access).
413. Yandle, supra note 121, at 49.
414. See Edwards, supra note 59, at 266 (citing the work of Cheung, who found "that
private owners of separate resources might compete with each other and/or importers in the
marketplace").
415. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34,52 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc) (quoting
United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 395 (1956)).
416. Having eaten Alaskan King salmon within hours of having caught it in a remote
stream, the author certainly recognizes that there is an appreciable difference between such fish
and farm-raised Atlantic salmon. This distinction does not mean, however, that the difference is
economically significant for purposes of a market power analysis.
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sustainable yield, it is not clear that they would have sufficient market power to
charge supercompetitive prices. Indeed, the growth of aquaculture worldwide
may obviate concerns about local fishing associations' ability to obtain and
wield market power.
The rule of reason should be applied where the conduct in question may
have some redeeming virtues, specifically if the conduct or arrangement may
enhance social welfare.41 7 On the other hand, "[a] decision to apply a per se
rule should be a decision that the conduct has no redeeming virtues, or at least
none worth considering. ''41 1 When courts apply the per se rules to collusive
fishery arrangements, they are implicitly rejecting the notion that the
conservation benefits of such arrangements are socially beneficial--or at least
not sufficiently socially beneficial to merit consideration in an antitrust analysis.
The problem is two-fold. First, as the Supreme Court has acknowledged, "For
the sake of business certainty and litigation efficiency [the law] tolerate[s] the
invalidation of some agreements that a full-blown inquiry might have proved
reasonable. 419 Second, the error of invalidating an arrangement under a per se
rule that is in fact net beneficial is more serious than subsequently invalidating
conduct that was initially upheld. As Judge Easterbrook notes:
If the court errs by condemning a beneficial practice, the benefits may be
lost for good. Any other firm that uses the condemned practice faces
sanctions in the name of stare decisis, no matter the benefits .... [J]udicial
errors that tolerate baleful practices are self correcting while erroneous
condemnations are not.42°
The cost of an overly restrictive antitrust rule is not simply the invalidation
of marginally more efficient economic arrangements. In at least some
instances, an overly restrictive rule will perpetuate unsustainable practices that
threaten to deplete, if not exhaust, marine fish populations. The trade-off is
between the risk of economic inefficiency and that of substantial environmental
harm, which can itself represent an economic inefficiency. While restrictions
on output may be undesirable from a consumer welfare standpoint, such
potentially anticompetitive behavior may be net welfare-enhancing in
comparison to the likely alternative of fishery depletion. 42' Viewed in this
417. See Gerhart, supra note 109, at 330 (stating that the per se rule should not be applied
if the conduct at issue has redeeming values worth evaluating).
418. Id.
419. Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 344 (1982).
420. Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits ofAntitrust, 63 TEx. L. REv. 1, 2-3 (1984).
421. In this sense, allowing such an outcome can be seen as a welfare-enhancing "second-
best" situation, in that it is better than any likely alternative scenario, even though it does not
conform with textbook definitions of a perfectly competitive outcome. See generally Peter J.
61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3 (2004)
light, there seems to be ample justification for evaluating the potentially
collusive conduct of private fishery associations under the rule of reason, rather
than a per se rule. As Professor Yandle argues, "cooperative efforts by
fishermen to restrict access to a commons, thereby sustaining a fishery, serve
the joint interests of the fishermen and consumers. 4 22 Indeed, in some cases
the optimal outcome will be for lowered output and increased prices to ensure
fishery sustainability.
B. Statutory Fixes
Protection of fisher conservation organizations from antitrust laws need
not come from the courts. As already noted, existing precedents discourage
fishers from adopting collaborative arrangements that could be subject to
423 Coantitrust scrutiny. Thus, Congress could expand the existing cooperative
exemption so as to encompass a wider array of potential fisher organizations.
Another alternative would be to create an exemption for collaborative entities
that a regulatory agency would certify or otherwise approve. Oversight by the
NMFS or some other agency could alleviate concerns that an antitrust
exemption would enable the creation of true anticompetitive cartels in fishery
markets.
There are already numerous exemptions to antitrust laws, including some
that are specifically designed to ensure the preservation of institutions with
social or other value.424 In 1970, Congress created an antitrust exemption for
newspapers to help ensure that major cities would continue to be served by
Hammer, Antitrust Beyond Competition: Market Failures, Total Welfare, and the Challenge of
Intramarket Second-Best Tradeoffs, 98 MICH. L. REv. 849 (2000). As Hammer notes,
"Analytically, the issues raised by intramarket second-best tradeoffs are similar to those raised
by the efficiency defense long advocated by Oliver Williamson," and that which underlies the
ancillary restraints doctrine. Id. at 876. For additional background on "second-best tradeoffs,"
see generally Richard S. Markovits, Monopolistic Competition, Second Best, and the Antitrust
Paradox: A Review Article, 77 MICH. L. REv. 567 (1979); Richard S. Markovits, Second-Best
Theory and Law & Economics: An Introduction, 73 Cr1.-KENT. L. REv. 3 (1998); Andrew P.
Morriss, Implications of Second-Best Theoryfor Administrative and Regulatory Law: A Case
Study of Public Utility Regulation, 73 CHn.-KENT L. REv. 135, 170-76 (1998); Oliver E.
Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs, 58 AM. ECON. REv. 18
(1968); Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense Revisited, 125 U. PA. L. REv.
699 (1977).
422. Yandle, supra note 121, at 49.
423. See supra Parts IV.A-B and accompanying text (describing agreements within the
fishery context that were held to be in violation of the Sherman Act).
424. See supra notes 206-07 (referencing exemptions).
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multiple newspapers. Under the Newspaper Preservation Act,425 newspapers in
the same city are authorized to merge their ownership, production, and
administration pursuant to a joint operation agreement, while keeping the
papers' respective reporting and editorial operations separate. While such
consolidation would normally raise substantial antitrust concerns, Congress
made the policy judgment that consolidation of newspaper ownership was
preferable to allowing numerous daily newspapers to fail.426 On the same basis,
Congress could adopt a limited antitrust exemption for fishery associations so
as to facilitate greater conservation efforts. As noted above, while such
associations may pose a potential risk of anticompetitive conduct, the welfare
losses of consolidation within portions of certain fishing markets may well be
less than the eventual welfare losses that will result from continued
unsustainable fishing practices.427
As an initial step, Congress could, for example, explicitly authorize the
creation of cooperatives in fisheries operating under a government imposed
total allowable catch. The benefits of such an exemption would be that fishers
could organize more associations like the PWCC and Pollock cooperative. On
the other hand, requiring the creation of a government-set total catch limit as a
prerequisite for an antitrust exemption continues to rely upon regulatory
agencies to set sustainable catch levels-something regulatory agencies have
not done well to date.428 Not only does the history of fishery regulation in U.S.
waters suggest that the imposition of such limits in many fisheries is unlikely,
allowing fisher associations to second-guess the government-set catch limit and
adopt their own, more restrictive catch limits would provide greater protection
against fishery collapse.
Fishers often have greater knowledge of fishery conditions than the
councils that regulate them.429 Moreover, when fishers have a clear stake in the
425. Newspaper Preservation Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1804 (2000).
426. See Edwin C. Baker, Media Concentration: Giving Up on Democracy, 54 FLA. L.
REv. 839, 858 (2002) (discussing the advantages and disadvantages of the Newspaper
Preservation Act). Some commentators believe that the Newspaper Preservation Act may in fact
threaten the maintenance of a free press. See, e.g., David A. Anderson, Freedom of the Press,
80 TEx. L. REv. 429,488 (2002) (discussing how the Act can enable a newspaper to close down
a competitor or obtain a legalized monopoly); Maurice E. Stucke & Allen P. Grunes, Antitrust
and the Marketplace of Ideas, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 249, 271 n.105 (describing the act as a
"Faustian bargain").
427. See supra notes 362-68 and accompanying text (describing danger of continued
unsustainable practices).
428. See supra notes 61-75 and accompanying text (describing failure to set sustainable
catch levels).
429. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text (commenting on the skill and
knowledge of fishers).
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fishery, either through formal ITQs or informal property rights, they have an
incentive to protect the value of the resource by refraining from excess
consumption. As noted above, the experience in New Zealand suggests that
fishers with a tangible stake in the fishery shift from being pure exploiters of
the resource to stewards.43 ° This fact might suggest that an alternative
condition to a government-set catch limit would be the recognition of formal or
informal property rights in the fishery, as well as the creation of management
institutions capable of ensuring the observance of sustantiable catch limits.
Another alternative would be for Congress to prescribe, in some detail, the
various factors that courts would be required to consider in antitrust actions
brought against fisher organizations that purport to limit or otherwise regulate
the catch in order to conserve the resource. For instance, antitrust cases could
be subject to a decision rule whereby a fisher organization that purports to set
catch levels at or near the maximum sustainable yield would be presumed legal.
When such an initial showing is made, the burden of demonstrating that the
fisher organization is, in fact, acting in an anticompetitive manner could shift to
the government agency or private plaintiff.
While statutory reform could be more detailed and definitive than judicial
precedent, statutory reforms would not be without their potential problems. In
particular, statutory reforms are likely to result in rigid, inflexible rules that
could prevent the development of alternative arrangements. As with oil field
unitization, well-intentioned legislation may actually preclude the development
of even more welfare-enhancing and conservation-oriented arrangements than
those envisioned by the legislative drafters.431 Any exemption will necessarily
be overinclusive, underinclusive, or both. Whatever balance is struck between
conservation and collusion, it is likely that further experience with collaborative
fishery organizations will illustrate the benefits of alternatives. Yet, once a
statutory reform is adopted, Congress may not revisit the issue for many
years.
432
If, as noted at the outset of this article, fundamental fishery reform is
unlikely, then statutory antitrust exemptions may be equally so. While such
exemptions exist, there is little reason to believe that Congress would be any
more willing to create such exemptions, so as to allow the development of
private fishery management organizations, than it is to authorize the adoption of
ITQ regimes by regional fishing councils. Indeed, one reason to create room
430. See supra notes 89-90, 280-8 1, and accompanying text (explaining the New Zealand
program and its results).
431. See supra Part V.A and accompanying text (examining oil field unitization).
432. At the time of this writing, Congress had not significantly amended the Magnuson Act
in twenty-seven years, making the act overdue for reauthorization.
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for private responses to fishery conservation concerns is precisely because
political responses take time and-at least in this context-rarely address the
underlying conservation problems. This fact makes allowing private
alternatives that much more important.
VII. Conclusion
Insofar as antitrust laws inhibit the development of formal cooperative
arrangements among resource users, it forces users to adopt one of three
courses, all of which may be substantially less optimal than the reliance upon
formal cooperative efforts to control resource use. First, they may seek
government regulatory measures to limit consumption of the resource. Given
the poor record of regulatory measures aimed at conserving fish stocks, this is a
less than ideal course. The adoption of property-based conservation schemes,
such as ITQs, may provide substantial benefits, but such proposals can be
politically difficult to implement.433 A second option is to adopt informal
community restraints upon overfishing. Such measures can be quite effective at
controlling catch levels in many contexts.434 Formalizing such arrangements is
not an option, however, because to memorialize the rules into formal contracts
is to raise potential antitrust concerns. A third option is simply to leave well
enough alone, and to extract rents from the fishery so long as one can. Given
the nature of open-access commons, this latter course may well lead to both
economic and ecological ruin.
The obstruction of cooperative solutions to the commons problem is not
likely to be unique to fisheries policy. At heart most, if not all, environmental
problems are commons problems of some sort.435 The pollution problem is just
as much an example of overuse of a common resource due to the lack of
binding constraints as the fisheries problem. Admittedly, where total catch
limits are in place, antitrust law is more tolerant of agreements among fishing
firms to allocate portions of the catch. Such arrangements enable firms to
capture some, but not all, of the gains that would come from private property.
Moreover, when there is no government-imposed limit on the total catch from a
fishery, the limitation on vertical integration in fishing cooperatives-that is,
the limitation on agreements between fishers and processors or wholesalers-
433. See supra 93-94 and accompanying text (describing difficulties in implementing these
proposals).
434. OSTROM, supra note 32; see also supra Part IV.C (examining effectiveness).
435. See generally Hardin, supra note 30.
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can make it more difficult for fishing firms to implement self-enforcing
cooperative ventures.
The purported aim of antitrust law is to improve consumer welfare by
proscribing actions and arrangements that reduce output and increase prices.
Conservation aims to improve human welfare by maximizing the long-term
productive use of natural resources, an aim that often requires limiting
consumption to sustainable levels. While such conservation measures might
increase prices in the short-run, when successful they enhance consumer
welfare by increasing long-term production and ensuring the availability of
valued resources over time. Insofar as antitrust law fails to take this into
account, it bars the creation and evolution of ecologically valuable and socially
beneficial arrangements among resource users. The threat to consumer welfare
from potentially collusive arrangements is real, but no more so than that of
resource depletion and environmental ruin.436 A conservation cartel may force
consumers to pay higher prices for a time, but the failure to conserve marine
resources may lead to species extinction and ecosystem disruption. It is time to
consider that the costs of antitrust law to conservation are greater than the threat
of conservation cartels in the marine commons.
436. As Professor Yandle observes:
The threats of wasted and destroyed fisheries, extinguished species, and diminished
water quality in rivers are real, but the possibilities that associated monopoly
restrictions will impose significant costs on the economy are purely speculative
and, if realized, are apt to be small and fleeting.
Yandle, supra note 121, at 40.
